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THE PRESS AND THE LAW: SOME ISSUES
IN DEFAMATION LITIGATION




Lackland H. Bloom, Jr. *
A significant number of reported defamation cases litigated against
the press' involve efforts to report on legal affairs and proceedings.
2
The plaintiffs in these cases are often the participants in the legal
matters in issue and include attorneys,3 judges,4 plaintiffs,5 defendants,
6
* B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D. University of Michigan. Associate Profes-
sor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. This Article does not attempt to analyze defamation cases pertaining to lawsuits filed
against nonmedia defendants although the reports also contain quite a few of these suits.
Many involve statements made during trial testimony or in pleadings or judicial records. Most
of these are fairly easily resolved under the fair-report privilege. Sometimes, the issues raised
in the nonmedia defamation cases are the same as or very similar to those raised in the media
cases. Often, however, significant differences as, for example, to proof of fault, arise.
2. Since 1970 courts have decided at least 300 such cases. See infra notes 3-328. This
Article concentrates exclusively on cases decided after 1964 when the Supreme Court first
began constitutionalizing elements of the law of defamation in New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). For the most part this Article analyzes cases following the Supreme
Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz modified much of
the legal analysis previously employed by the courts.
3. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster,
844 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1988); Tate v. Bradley, 837 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1988); Trotter v. Ander-
son, 818 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1987); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Quilici v. Second Amendment Found., 769 F.2d 414
(7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986); Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for
Men, 754 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d
549 (9th Cir. 1983); Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1982); Curtis v. South-
western Newspapers, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1651 (5th Cir. 1982); Littlefield v. Fort Dodge
Messenger, 614 F.2d 581 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1980); Orr v. Argus-Press Co.,
586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1978); Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824
(D.C. Cir. 1976); Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 464 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1972); Wasserman v. Time,
Inc., 424 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 940 (1970); Harkaway v. Boston Herald
Traveler Corp., 418 F.2d 56 (1st Cir. 1969); Zerman v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 677 F. Supp.
1316 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Catalfo v. Jensen, 657 F. Supp. 463 (D.N.H. 1987); Murray v. Bailey,
613 F. Supp. 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Joseph v. Xerox Corp., 594 F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C. 1984);
Lane v. New York Times, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1623 (W.D. Tenn. 1982); Goodrick v.
Gannett Co., 500 F. Supp. 125 (D. Del. 1980); Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386 (D.V.I.
1979); Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
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Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Carey v. Hume, 390 F.
Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1975); Pemberton v. Birmingham News Co., 482 So. 2d 257 (Ala. 1985);
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc, v. Church, 24 Ariz. App. 287, 537 P.2d 1345, cert. denied, 425 U.S.
908 (1975); Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 281 Ark. 25, 660 S.W.2d 933 (1983);
Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076
(1980); McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 83, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518, 727 P.2d 711 (1986);
Belli v. Berryhill, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Weingarten v. Block,
102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1980); Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489
So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987); Huszar v. Gross, 468
So. 2d 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Western Broadcasting v. Wright, 182 Ga. App. 359, 356
S.E.2d 53 (1987); Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891
(1977); Wanless v. Rothballer, 115 Il1. 2d 158, 503 N.E.2d 316 (1986), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
929 (1987); Owen v. Carr, 134 Ill. App. 3d 855, 478 N.E.2d 658 (1985); Matchett v. Chicago
Bar Ass'n, 1225 11. App. 3d 1004, 467 N.E.2d 271 (1984); Fried v. Jacobson, 99 Ill. 2d 24, 457
N.E.2d 392 (1983); Chapski v. Copley Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 442 N.E.2d 195 (1982); Wexler v.
Chicago Tribune Co.,69 Ill. App. 3d 610, 387 N.E.2d 892 (1979); Bontkowski v. Chicago Sun-
Times, 115 IIl. App. 2d 229, 252 N.E.2d 689 (1969); Savelas v. Law Bulletin Pub. Co., 115 Il1.
App. 2d 205, 253 N.E.2d 168 (1969); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623
S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981); E.W. Scripps Co. v. Ball, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1693 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1987); Drury v. Feeney, 505 So. 2d I I I (La. Ct. App. 1987), writ denied, 506 So. 2d 1225
(La. 1987); McHale v. Lake Charles American Press, 390 So.2d 556 (La. Ct. App. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 951 (1981); Hamilton v. Lake Charles American Press, Inc., 372 So. 2d 239
(La. Ct. App. 1979); Prince v. Curtis, 1 Mass. App. 810, 294 N.E.2d 499 (1973); Dineen v.
Star Press, Inc., 391 A.2d 834 (Me. 1978); Fisher v. Detroit Free Press, 158 Mich. App. 409,
404 N.W.2d 765 (1987); Kurtz v. Evening News Ass'n, I Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2340 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1985); Hayes v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 97 Mich. App. 758, 295 N.W.2d 858 (1980);
Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978); Anton v. St.
Louis Suburban Newspapers, Inc., 598 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Cox v. Lee Enters.
Inc., 723 P.2d 238 (Mont. 1986); Marchiando v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 649 P.2d 462 (1982);
Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 449 N.E.2d 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d 822, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831
(1983); Gurda v. Orange County Publications, 56 N.Y.2d 705, 436 N.E.2d 1326, 451 N.Y.S.2d
724 (1982); Sills v. New York Times Co., 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460 (N.Y. 1982); Cohn V.
National Broadcasting Co., 50 N.Y.2d 885, 408 N.E.2d 672, 430 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1980); No-
vember v. Time, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 175, 194 N.E.2d 126, 244 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1963); Dibble v.
WROC-TV Channel 8, 142 A.D.2d 966, 530 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1988); Golub v. Esquire Publish-
ing, Inc., 124 A.D.2d 528,508 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1986); Roche v. Hearst Corp., 72 A.D.2d 245,
424 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1980), aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 707, 421 N.E.2d 844, 439 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1981);
Hahn v. Andrello, 44 A.D.2d 501, 355 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1974); Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 A.D.2d 517,
251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964), aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 1023, 207 N.E.2d 620, 260 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1965);
Hentell v. Knopf, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Brower v. The New
Republic, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Cohn v. Am-Law, 5 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2367 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Polakoff v. Harcourt Brace, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
2516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); Plough v. Schneider, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1621 (Ohio Ct. App.
1982); Sellers v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 687 P.2d 116 (Okla. 1987); Fitzpatrick v. Philadel-
phia Newspaper, Inc., 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1210 (Pa. Super. 1989); Curran v. Philadel-
phia Newspapers, 376 Pa. Super. 508, 546 A.2d 639 (1988); Frisk v. News Co., 361 Pa. Super.
536, 523 A.2d 347 (1986); Sprague v. Walter, 357 Pa. Super. 570, 516 A.2d 706 (1986); DeCar-
ralhoe v. DaSilva, 414 A.2d 806 (R.I. 1980); Padgett v. Sun News, 278 S.C. 26, 292 S.E.2d 30
(1982); Windsor v. Tennessean, 654 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983); El Paso Times, Inc. v.
Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Crites v. Mullins, 697
S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Herron v. KING Broadcast-
ing Co., 109 Wash. 2d 514, 746 P.2d 295 (1987); Herron v. Tribune Publishing Co., 108 Wash.
2d 162, 736 P.2d 249 (1987); Miller v. Charleston Gazette, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2540 (W.
Va. 1983); D'Amato v. Freeman Printing Co., 38 Wis. 589, 157 N.W.2d 686 (1968).
4. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L. Ed. 2d
562 (1989); Jenkins v. KYQ, 829 F.2d 403 (3rd Cir. 1987); Simonson v. United Press Int'l, 654
F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1981); Dostert v. Washington Post, 531 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. W. Va. 1982);
Times Publishing Co. v. Huffstetler, 409 So. 2d 112 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 417
So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1982); Berkos v. National Broadcasting Co., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476, 515 N.E.2d
668 (1987), appeal denied, 119 Ill. 2d 553, 522 N.E.2d 1241 (1988); Young v. Meyer, 527 So.
2d 391 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366
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witnesses, 7 and subjects of investigations8 and persons whom the press has
N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, cert.denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); DiLorenzo v. New York
News, Inc., 81 A.D.2d 844, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1981); Rinaldi v. Village Voice, Inc., 47 A.D.2d
180, 365 N.Y.S.2d 199, cert.denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Marks v. New York News, 4 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Celebrezze v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 41 Ohio
App. 3d 343, 535 N.E.2d 755 (1988); Harris v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 40 Ohio App. 3d
127, 532 N.E.2d 192 (1988); DiSalle V.P.G. Publishing Co., 375 Pa. Super. 510, 544 A.2d
1345, appeal denied, 521 Pa. 620, 557 A.2d 724 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216, 106 L.
Ed. 2d 566 (1989); Braig v. Field Communications, 310 Pa. Super. 569, 456 A.2d 1366 (1983);
Fink v. Packard Press Corp., 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1193 (Pa. C. 1989); Guinn v. Texas
Newspapers, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 864, 102 L. Ed. 2d 988 (1988) (Justice of the Peace); see also Ross v. News-
Journal Co., 228 A.2d 531 (Del. 1967) (unauthorized alderman); Standke v. B.E. Darby &
Sons, Inc., 291 Minn. 468, 193 N.W.2d 139 (1971) (members of grand jury), cert. dismissed,
406 U.S. 902 (1972).
5. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co.,
838 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 715, 103 L. Ed. 2d. 18 (1988); Lal v. CBS,
Inc., 726 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1984); Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981); Tomson v. Stephan, 699 F. Supp. 860 (D. Kan. 1988);
DiLeo v. Koltnow, 200 Colo. 119, 613 P.2d 318 (1980); Read v. News Journal Co., 474 A.2d
119 (Del. 1984); DeLuca v. Newsday, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985);
Shiffiet v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 179, 431 N.E.2d 1014 (1982); Camer v.
Seattle Post-Intelligence, 45 Wash. App. 29, 723 P.2d 1195 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916
(1987).
6. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Brueggemeyer v. Associated
Press, 609 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Stanco Sports Library, 542 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.
1976); Lambert v. Providence Journal Co., 508 F.2d 656 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828
(1975); Chang v. Michiana Telecasting Corp., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1889 (N.D. Ind.
1987); Karp v. Hill & Knowlton, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y 1986); Bryant v. Associated
Press, 595 F. Supp. 814 (D.V.I 1984); Ricci v. Venture Magazine, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 1563 (D.
Mass. 1983); Casper v. Washington Post Co., 549 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Tawfik v.
Loyd, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2067 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc.,
273 F. Supp. 967 (D. Minn. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Pritchard v. Times S.
W. Broadcasting, Inc., 277 Ark. 458, 642 S.W.2d 877 (1982); Jennings v. Telegram-Tribune
Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 119, 210 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1985); Donaldson v. Washington Post, 3 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1436 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1977); Newell v. Field Enters., Inc., 91 11. App. 3d 735,
415 N.E.2d 434 (1980); Nagib v. News-Sun, Div. Keystone Printing Serv., Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d
752, 381 N.E.2d 1014 (1978); Bannach v. Field Enters., 5 Ill. App. 3d 692, 284 N.E.2d 31
(1972); Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 738 P.2d 1246 (1987); Hop-
kins v. Keith, 348 So. 2d 999 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Schaefer v. Hearst Corp., 5 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1734 (Md. Baltimore City Super. Ct. 1979); Jackson v. Longcope, 394 Mass. 577, 476
N.E.2d 617 (1985); Grobe v. Three Village Herald, 69 A.D.2d 175, 420 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1979),
aff'd, 49 N.Y.2d 932, 406 N.E.2d 491, 428 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1980); Suriano v. New York News,
11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984); Jones v. Sun Publishing Co., 278 S.C. 12,
292 S.E.2d 23, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wash. 2d 473, 635
P.2d 1081 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982); O'Brien v. Tribune Publishing Co., 7
Wash. App. 107, 499 P.2d 24 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973).
7. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988); Nelson v.
Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Lemmer v. Arkansas Gazette Co.,
620 F. Supp. 1332 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Dresbach v. Doubleday Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C.
1981); Mclver v. Talahassee Democrat, Inc., 489 So. 2d 793 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 500 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1986); Friedgood v. Peters Publishing Co., 13 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1479 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1986), aff'd, 521 So. 2d 236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 531
So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 867, 102 L.Ed.2d. 991 (1989); Hoag v. Char-
lotte Republican-Tribune, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1535 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1979); Wilhoit v.
WCSC, Inc., 293 S.C. 34, 358 S.E.2d 397 (Ct. App. 1987); Burgess v. Reformer Publishing
Co., 508 A.2d 1359 (Vt. 1986).
8. Porter v. Guam Publications, Inc., 643 F.2d 615 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 90
(1981) (person arrested on false charges); Schuster v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 602
F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1979) (person indicted by grand jury); Zurita v. Virgin Islands Daily News,
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mistakenly identified as participants in legal proceedings or investigations. 9
Several factors explain why press reporting of legal affairs results in defama-
tion suits. Legal matters and proceedings often involve serious charges bear-
ing great potential for defamatory harm if false.10 Moreover, the risk of
error is frequently significant since reporters must often decipher technical
legal terminology and restate complex results of legal proceedings under the
pressure of a deadline. I I Another possibility is that many of the plaintiffs in
these defamation suits are not hesitant to go into court to assert their rights,
578 F. Supp. 306 (D.V.I. 1984) (subject of investigations); Williams v. WCAU-TV, 555 F.
Supp. 198 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (person arrested as bank robbery suspect); Gay v. Williams, 486 F.
Supp. 12 (D. Alaska 1979) (suspect in organized crime investigation); Karp v. Miami Herald
Publishing Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (person under investigation by INS);
Minton v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 525, 333 S.E.2d 913 (1985) (plaintiff
charged with driving under influence of alcohol); Mattson v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 156 Ill.
App. 3d 613, 509 N.E.2d 150 (person suspected of stealing food), appeal denied, 116 Ill. 2d
561, 515 N.E.2d 111 (1987); Melon v. Capital City Press, 407 So. 2d 85 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(person arrested on drug charges), writ denied, 409 So. 2d (La. 1982); Rosen v. Capital City
Press, 314 So. 2d 511 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (indicted physician); Jones v. Taibbi, 400 Mass. 786,
512 N.E.2d 260 (1987) (suspect in murder investigation); Sibley v. Holyoke Transcript-Tele-
gram Publishing Co., 391 Mass. 468, 461 N.E.2d 823 (1982) (subject of police investigation);
Rouch v. Enquirer & News, 427 Mich. 157, 398 N.W.2d 245 (1986) (person arrested for rape
but not charged); Penn v. Detroit Free Press, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2129 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1986) (public official investigated for fraud); Molnar v. Star-Ledger, 193 N.J. Super. 12, 471
A.2d 1209 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1984) (suspect of maintenance code violation); Robart v. Post-
Standard, 52 N.Y.2d 843, 418 N.E.2d 664, 437 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1981) (person ticketed for failing
to carry insurance identification card); Brown v. Johnson Newspapers Corp., 84 A.D.2d 636,
444 N.Y.S.2d 493 (App. Div. 1981) (person arrested for assault); Post v. Oregonian Publishing
Co., 268 Or. 214, 519 P.2d 1258 (1974) (suspect identified in police all-points bulletin); Burgess
v. Reformer Publishing Corp., 146 Vt. 612, 508 A.2d 1359 (1986) (witness before grand jury);
Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1980) (subject of police search).
9. Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (lawyer with same name as lawyer
subject to professional discipline); Bell v. Associated Press, 584 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1984)
(professional football player misidentified as person arrested for public lewdness); Nesbitt v.
Multimedia, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1473 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (father of person charged with
larceny); Slocum v. Webb, 375 So. 2d 125 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (father misidentified as son who
was suspect in investigation); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985) (com-
plainant in child abuse case misidentified as suspect), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 215 Kan. 233, 531 P.2d 76, 83 (1975) ("dam-
age done by negligent reporting of such court proceedings can be just as devastating to the
individual as that resulting from false reporting done maliciously"); McCall v. Courier-Journal
& Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 844-885 (Ky. 1981) (charge that attorney trying to fix
case is defamatory as matter of law), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rine-
hart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (charges that judge
is probably corrupt are defamatory), cert denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); DiLorenzo v. New York
News, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 669, 672, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 486-87 (1981) (charge that court convicted
judge of perjury may be defamatory); see also infra notes 173-178, 198-240 and accompanying
text.
11. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 451-52 (1976) (composing story with-
out adequate verification under deadline pressure may have been negligent); Buchanon v. As-
sociated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1204 (D.D.C. 1975) (legal distinction in court proceedings
between campaign contributions and expenditures understandably confused reporters operat-
ing under deadline pressure); LaMon v. Butler, 110 Wash. 2d. 216, 222-23, 751 P.2d 842, 845
(1988) (reporter not negligent in misunderstanding ambiguous court order after conferring
with city attorney); see also Bloom, Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 VAND.
L. REV. 247, 267-70, 359-60 (1985); infra notes 200-331 and accompanying text. But see
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76, 81 (1975) (explaining law does not
provide absolute privilege for defamatory statements contained in reporting of judicial pro-
ceedings because "judicial proceedings are peculiarly susceptible to exact reporting; an account
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since many are already deeply involved in litigation and others, such as law-
yers and judges, are quite accustomed to it. 12 Finally, it is likely that as with
much other defamation litigation, many plaintiffs in these cases have motives
for filing suit beyond the prospect of recovery of damages to reputation.
Such motives may include promoting political ends, striking back at the
press, or trying to influence the underlying legal proceeding.
13
These cases cut across all of the legal issues raised in media defamation
litigation in general. Often the treatment of a particular legal issue raised in
a media defamation case is not peculiar. Frequently, however, unique twists
to or common themes connecting these cases arise. One may study and ana-
lyze these cases by focusing on several different themes or issues that are
presented. This Article will focus on two specific themes that may bear a
relationship to each other.
The first theme is the treatment, as a matter of constitutional law, of the
participants in legal matters and proceedings as public figures or officials and
the treatment of such matters and proceedings as public controversies or
matters of public concern. The resolution of these issues is generally of great
significance in the individual case since it will determine whether the strict
actual malice standard of fault or some lower standard such as negligence
1 4
is applicable. The way that courts tend to decide these issues in this type of
case is of more general interest in that it involves an important first amend-
ment issue-the degree to which the law favors uninhibited reporting of
legal matters and proceedings.
The second theme focuses on the degree of accuracy that the press is le-
gally expected to achieve in covering legal matters and proceedings. This is
a theme that cuts across several specific legal issues raised in defamation
litigation, including whether the statements are defamatory, whether they
are true or false, whether they are fact or protected opinion, whether they
are a privileged fair and accurate report of an official or judicial proceeding,
and whether the reporter is at fault if the statements are false and defama-
tory. As with the public figure issue, the degree of accuracy to which the
law holds the press will often prove to be determinative of the outcome of a
particular case. The general manner in which the courts deal with the accu-
racy of media usage of legal terminology and descriptions of legal matters,
of that which transpired at trial is not contingent upon fallible or futile modes of investigation;
court records are available ....").
12. Well-known attorney Melvin Belli for instance has brought defamation suits on sev-
eral occasions. See Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc., 389 F.2d 579, cert. denied, 393
U.S. 579 (1967); Belli v. Berryhill, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Belli v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1972); cf. McBride v. Merrill
Dow, 717 F.2d 1460, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (statement that he testified for client of "flamboy-
ant" attorney Melvin Belli did not defame expert witness).
13. See Bezanson, The Libel Suit in Retrospect: What Plaintiffs Want and What Plaintiffs
Get, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 789 (1986); Bezanson, Libel Law and the Realities of Libel Litigation:
Setting the Record Straight, 71 IOWA L. REV. 226 (1985); Soloski, The Study and the Libel
Plaintiff: Who Sues for Libel?, 71 IOWA L. REV. 217 (1985). For a discussion of the dynamics
of modern defamation litigation, see also Smolla, Let the Libel Author Beware. The Rejuvena-
tion of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1983).
14. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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proceedings, and participants will also have a major effect on press coverage
of the legal world as well as a participant's right to sue successfully for harm
caused to reputation by defamatory falsehood.
On both issues one can discern a dominant trend accompanied by a some-
what weaker countertrend. The courts generally tend to find that legal mat-
ters and proceedings are not public controversies' 5 and participants in them
are not public figures. 16 Some cases, however, seem to lean in the opposite
direction, and perhaps more importantly, a fair amount of contemporary
first amendment jurisprudence is arguably in tension with these cases. With
respect to the degree of accuracy to which the press is held in covering legal
matters and proceedings, the dominant trend is to give reporters a fair mar-
gin of error regardless of the specific legal context in which the issue arises.
The principle is not without limits however. No conscious relationship be-
tween the manner in which the courts deal with these issues appears to exist.
To the extent that the courts tend to favor the plaintiff on the constitutional
public figure issue, they tend to favor the defendant under both the common
law and the constitution when the focus is on the accuracy either of the
media's use of legal terminology or of its description of legal affairs.
I. PUBLIC FIGURES AND CONTROVERSIES
A. The Public Figure and Legal Matters
The outcome of defamation litigation is frequently determined by whether
the plaintiff is characterized as a public figure.' 7 If the plaintiff is a public
figure, then as a matter of constitutional law he must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant published the defamatory falsehood
with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or
with reckless disregard for whether or not they were true.1 8 Reckless disre-
gard for the truth in turn has a subjective focus and requires proof that the
defendant published the statements in question with a "high degree of
awareness of [their] probable falsity". 19 This is an extremely' difficult stan-
dard to meet. In the vast majority of cases in which the issue of fault is
litigated, public figure plaintiffs lose either at trial or on appeal.
20
15. See infra notes 137-155 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 17-136 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987) (absolutely no proof of actual malice after court
determined plaintiff attorney was public figure); Steere v. Cupp, 226 Kan. 566, 602 P.2d 1267,
1274 (1979) (no proof of actual malice required once court determined plaintiff was a public
figure). See Ashdown, Of Public Figures and Public Interest - The Libel Law Conundrum, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (1984); Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905
(1984).
18. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974). The Court in New
York Times v. Sullivan, 346 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), initially devised and applied the actual
malice standard to public officials; the Court in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967), first extended the heightened degree of protection to public figures.
19. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)).
20. See Bloom, supra note 11, at 330-35; Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why; A Study
of Defamation Litigation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 455, 491 (1980).
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With respect to private figure plaintiffs, however, the states may permit
recovery if the plaintiff can establish the defendant's fault by a less exacting
standard than actual malice. 2 1 Almost all state courts have adopted a negli-
gence standard as the appropriate standard of fault when the plaintiff is a
private figure. 22 This is a significantly easier standard for the plaintiff to
satisfy than actual malice.23 Consequently, virtually all defamation plaintiffs
will attempt to argue, if at all possible, that they are private rather than
public figures.
Three of the Supreme Court's most significant cases addressing the public
figure determination involve media reporting of legal matters. These three
cases, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,24 Time, Inc. v. Firestone,2 5 and Wolston v.
Reader's Digest,26 provide the basic framework for determining whether a
court should consider any defamation plaintiff, and more specifically a trial
participant, to be a public figure.
In Gertz a prominent Chicago attorney sued a right wing opinion journal
for defaming him in an article it published concerning his representation of
the family of a boy who had been shot and killed by a police officer. 27 The
Supreme Court used the Gertz case as a vehicle for developing the public
figure/private figure analysis in some detail. It noted that a plaintiff could be
a public figure for all purposes 28 or an involuntary public figure. 29 It empha-
sized, however, that far and away the most typical public figure will be the
limited purpose public figure, that is, a person who "thrust[s] [himself] to the
forefront of [a] particular public controvers[y] in order to influence the reso-
lution of the issues involved." °30 The Court explained that public figures are
entitled to lesser degree of legal protection of their reputations than private
figures, because they have assumed the risk of media attention by attempting
to influence a public controversy; they are also less in need of protection
because they are generally capable of responding to any charges through the
media itself.3 1 As will be discussed in greater detail below, 32 the Court
found that the plaintiff in Gertz was neither an all purpose or limited purpose
public figure. 33 Consequently, he was not required to meet the difficult ac-
21. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
22. See Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 771 P.2d 406, 424 n.26, 257
Cal. Rptr. 406 (1989) (listing thirty three state court decisions opting for the negligence stan-
dard). For a discussion of other standards of fault adopted by state courts, see Bloom, supra
note 11, at 251 n.14.
23. See Bloom, supra note 11, at 386-93.
24. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
25. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
26. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
27. 418 U.S. at 325-27.
28. Id. at 345.
29. Id. The Court noted that "[h]ypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become
a public figure through no purposeful action of his own, but the instances of truly involuntary
public figures must be exceedingly rare."
30. Id.
31. Id. at 344.
32. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
33. 418 U.S. at 351-52.
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tual malice standard of fault in order to recover. 34 In the course of its opin-
ion, the Court also rejected the contention developed by the plurality
opinion in the earlier case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,35 that the
actual malice standard should apply to all matters of public interest even if
the plaintiff in the defamation suit did not happen to be a public figure. 3 6
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone37 the Court held that the plaintiff, a prominent
socialite and petitioner in a highly publicized divorce proceeding, was not a
public figure. 38 Perhaps even more importantly, the Court determined that a
titillating celebrity divorce trial was not what the Court had in mind as a
public controversy in Gertz.39 The Court also explicitly rejected the claim
that the actual malice standard should apply to all reports of judicial
proceedings. 4°
Finally in Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association,4 1 the Court held that a
person who had pleaded guilty to contempt for failing to appear before a
grand jury investigating Soviet espionage fifteen years prior to the publica-
tion of the article was not a public figure at the time of the incident. 42 Jus-
tice Blackmun concurred on the grounds that even if the plaintiff had been a
public figure at the time of the contempt charge, he would no longer remain
a public figure due to the passage of time.
43
B. Attorneys as Public Figures
Several relatively recent cases have addressed the issue of whether a court
should consider an attorney, frequently an attorney involved in controversial
litigation, to be a public figure. In many cases in which the attorney is a
prosecutor the attorney must satisfy the actual malice standard because he is
a public official rather than a public figure.44 The same is true when the
34. Id. at 352.
35. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
36. 418 U.S. at 346-47.
37. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
38. Id. at 453-54.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
42. Id. at 165-68.
43. Id. at 169, 171.
44. See, e.g., Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir.) (former attorney gen-
eral), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Curtis v. Southwestern Newspapers, 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1651 (5th Cir. 1982); Murray v. Bailey, 613 F. Supp. 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (assistant
district attorney); Goodrick v. Gannett Co., 500 F. Supp. 125, 126 (D. Del. 1980) (assistant
district attorney); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church, 24 Ariz. App. 287, 537 P.2d 1345
(1976) (attorney general); McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d 83, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518,
727 P.2d 711 (1986) (former prosecutor); Weingarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 701 (1980) (city attorney); Wanless v. Rothballer, 115 Ill. 2d 158, 503 N.E.2d 316 (vil-
lage solicitor), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1986); E.W. Scripps Co. v. Ball, 14 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1693 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (county prosector); McHale v. Lake Charles American
Press, 390 So. 2d 557 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (city attorney), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 951 (1981);
Dineen v. Star Press, Inc., 391 A.2d 834 (Me. 1978) (prosecutor); Roche v. Hearst Corp., 53
N.Y.2d 767, 421 N.E.2d 844, 439 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1981) (city attorney); Sills v. New York
Times, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (former state attorney general);
Hentell v. Knopf, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1908 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (former district attor-
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plaintiff is a judge.4 5 In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held
reluctantly that members of a grand jury are public officials or public
figures.
4 6
Gertz is the leading case not simply on public figures in general but specifi-
cally on lawyers as public figures.47 Initially, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that Gertz was a public official either because he had served on a
government housing commission briefly in the past or because as an attorney
attending a coroner's inquest he was an officer of the court.4 8 The Court
correctly recognized that the latter theory was nothing more than a play on
words that would automatically subject all litigating attorneys to the actual
malice standard.49 Next, the Court rejected the contention that Gertz was a
public figure for all purposes simply because he was active in civic and pro-
fessional associations and had published many books and articles on legal
subjects.5 ° The Court pointed out that he had not attained general fame or
notoriety in the community and that none of the prospective jurors in the
defamation trial had heard of him.
5 1
Finally, the Court turned to the question of whether Gertz was a limited
ney); Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 376 Pa. Super. 508, 546 A.2d 639 (1988) (former
U.S. attorney); Frisk v. News Co., 361 Pa. Super. 536, 523 A.2d 347 (1986) (public solicitor);
Sprague v. Walter, 357 Pa. Super. 570, 516 A.2d 706 (1986) (district attorney); Windsor v.
Tennessean, 654 S.W.2d 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (former assistant U.S. attorney); El Paso
Times, Inc. v. Kerr, 706 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied,
480 U.S. 932 (1987) (assistant U.S. attorney); Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., 109 Wash.
2d 514, 746 P.2d 295 (1987) (prosecuting attorney); Miller v. Charleston Gazette, 9 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 2540, 2542-43 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 1983) (nominee for U. S. attorney). But see Bufa-
lino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (borough solicitor is not a public
official when the article does not identify him by his position but only as an attorney).
45. Harte-Hankes Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2684-85, 105
L. Ed. 2d 562, 569 (1989) (acting judge and candidate for judicial office); Jenkins v. KYW, 829
F.2d 403, 407 (3rd Cir. 1987); Ross v. News-Journal Co., 228 A.2d 531, 532 (Del. 1967);
Berkos v. NBC, Inc., 161 Ill. App. 3d 476, 515 N.E.2d 668, 675 (1987); Rinaldi v. Holt,
Rhinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 379, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1305, N.Y.S.2d 943, 949,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); DiLorenzo v. New York News, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 669, 432
N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (1981); Rinaldi v. Village Voice, Inc., 47 A.D.2d 180, 365 N.Y.S.2d 199,
201, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Deluca v. Newsday, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1525,
1526 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Celebrezze v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 41 Ohio App. 3d 343, 345,
535 N.E.2d 755, 757-58 (1988); Harris v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 40 Ohio App. 3d 127,
128, 532 N.E.2d 192, 194 (1988); Braig v. Field Communications, 500 Pa. 430, 456 A.2d 1366,
1371-72 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984); DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 375 Pa.
Super. 510, 544 A.2d 1345, 1348-49 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216, 106 L. Ed. 2d 566
(1989). But see Guinn v. Texas Newspapers, Inc., 738 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, no writ history), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 864, 102 L. Ed. 2d 988 (question of
fact as to whether Justice of the Peace not identified as such is a public official).
46. Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 291 Minn. 468, 480-82, 193 N.W.2d 139, 142-43
(1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 902 (1972). The court relied on the grand jury's authority to
exercise governmental power and noted its reluctance due to its practical and perhaps legal
inability to defend itself in the press. Id.; see also Cassady v. Marcum, 11 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2046, 2047 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1984) (foreman of grand jury investigating public corruption
is public figure). But cf., Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Stewart, 668 S.W.2d 727, 729
(Tex. App. -Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ dism'd) (court reporter is not a public figure).
47. 418 U.S. at 351-52.
48. Id. at 351.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 351-52.
51. Id. The Court is clearly hesitant to find all purpose public figures and would seem to
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purpose public figure and concluded that he was not. 52 It emphasized that
he played only a limited role in the coroner's investigation in his representa-
tion of a private client, took no part in the criminal prosecution of the police
officer and discussed neither the criminal nor civil litigation with the press.
53
Consequently, he "did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue,
nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its
outcome."
54
The Court apparently conceded that in fact a public controversy sur-
rounding the shooting of the boy by the police officer did exist but that
Gertz, a private attorney, could become a public figure only by attempting to
influence its outcome in the press rather than through the legal process. 55
Perhaps the Court believed that it should not hold an attorney to have as-
sumed the risk of potentially defamatory press coverage simply by doing his
job as an attorney in a controversial case as opposed to trying his case in the
media. Although potentially defamatory coverage will not necessarily be
less likely to follow the former than the latter, the Court seemed to say that
as a matter of fairness the attorney who has not sought out press coverage
should not have to assume such a risk. In his concurring opinion, Justice
Burger warned that the Court would be making a mistake by applying the
public figure doctrine in such a manner as to undermine the important pub-
lic policy of encouraging lawyers to undertake the representation of clients
in unpopular and controversial cases. 56 He is certainly correct that this is an
important public policy that courts should not discourage, but one may
question whether simply increasing the burden that the attorney would have
to bear in a potential defamation case would have any significant deterrent
effect on lawyers contemplating taking on such cases, at least as compared to
the impact of loss of income or adverse but nondefamatory publicity.
Some significant lower court cases have applied the Gertz analytical
framework to attorney-plaintiffs in defamation litigation. In Peisner v.
Detroit Free Press Inc., the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a prominent
attorney appointed to appeal the murder conviction of an indigent defendant
was not a public figure. 5" In Steere v. Cupp58 the Kansas Supreme Court
reached the unusual conclusion that the plaintiff, an attorney who a court
require that a plaintiff must have reached celebrity status at least in the community in which
the publication was circulated. Id.
52. Id. at 352.
53. Id.
54. Id. Justice Brennan in dissent conceded that Gertz was not a public figure but argued
that the actual malice standard should apply because the shooting and the ensuing litigation
constituted a matter of public interest under Rosenbloom. Id. at 361-69.
55. Id. at 352.
56. Id. at 355.
57. 82 Mich. App, 153, 266 N.W.2d 693, 696 (1978) (appointed counsel in murder trial is
private figure); See McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 886
(Ky. 1981) (apparently assuming criminal defense attorney in narcotics prosecution is private
figure); Polakoff v. Harcourt Brace, 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2516, 2517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978)
(attorney who represented major organized crime figure forty years earlier was not public
figure).
58. 226 Kan. 566, 602 P.2d 1267 (1979).
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censured for conduct that occurred in his defense of a murder suspect, was
not a limited purpose public figure for purposes of the trial but was in fact an
all purpose public figure in the small Kansas community. 59 As to the public
controversy surrounding the murder trial, the Court felt bound by Gertz and
its analysis even though it noted that by responding to press questioning, he
was probably more visible than the plaintiff in Gertz.6° The Court's analysis
does seem consistent with Gertz on this point in that Steere apparently made
no attempt to try his case in the press. Relying on Steere's long history of
public service and social prominence in the Kansas county, the court con-
cluded that he was a public figure for all purposes even while acknowledging
that it understood Gertz to counsel that such a characterization should be
applied sparingly. 61 This analysis seems to be based on the conclusion that
Steere was evidently a big fish in a small pond. It is doubtful that the same
degree of civic and social prominence would, lead to the conclusion that a
similar attorney was an all purpose public figure in Chicago or New York.
Even so, it seems likely that on these facts the Supreme Court might well
have agreed with any of the three dissenting opinions that vigorously dis-
puted the majority's conclusion that Steere was an all purpose public fig-
ure.62 As Justice Miller put it "[u]nder this rationale, hundreds, if not
thousands of Kansans are public figures for all purposes."
'63
While Gertz indicates that courts will generally not consider attorneys en-
gaged in litigation to be public figures, one certainly should not read the case
to suggest that attorneys can never be public figures. In the pre-Gertz case of
Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co.,64 the court readily accepted the stipulation by
well-known attorney Melvin Belli that he was a public figure in the context
of his defense of Jack Ruby, in one of the more celebrated criminal cases of
59. 602 P.2d at 1273.
60. Id. at 1273-74.
61. Id. A number of courts have held that an attorney is a public figure as a result of
activities only tangentially related to the practice of law. See Joseph v. Xerox Corp., 594 F.
Supp. 330, 332-34 (D.D.C. 1984) (attorney who wrote book on self-representation is public
figure for purposes of controversy on that subject); Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489
So. 2d 72, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied., 479 U.S. 1088 (1986) (attorney was limited
purpose public figure due to his role as trustee in dispute over gift to university); DeCarvaho v.
daSilva, 414 A.2d 807, 813 (R.I. 1980) (attorney is "giant" in Portuguese community appar-
ently because of civic and political activities as well as due to law practice); Lane v. New York
Times, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1623, 1625 (W.D. Tenn. 1982) (attorney who published several
controversial books is public figure); see also Bufalino v. Detroit Magazine, 14 Media L. Rep.
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1597, 1598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (plaintiff who alleged he had reputa-
tion as labor leader, fighter for equality, poet, lecturer and lawyer basically conceded he was
public figure).
62. 602 P.2d at 1274 (Holmes, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. at 1275
(Miller, J., dissenting); id. (Schroeder, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1275.
64. 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 102 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1972). In the more recent case of Belli v.
Berryhill, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) the court took notice of this
finding and held that Belli was also a public figure for the purposes of that case based on his
assertion in his pleadings that he was "an attorney, public figure, and the most prolific legal
writer of his time" as well as on the fact that after filing a lawsuit against 200 financial institu-




the century.6 5 Belli would probably qualify as a limited or all purpose public
figure under Gertz analysis as well.
In the more recent case of Ratner v. Young, 66 which involved defamatory
statements pertaining to a criminal trial arising out of a racially motivated
mass murder on a golf course, the federal district court for the Virgin Islands
applied the Gertz analysis and held that criminal defense attorney William
Kunstler was an all purpose public figure. 67 With respect to Kunstler, the
court noted that he had been one of the leading lawyers for radical causes in
the country over the past two decades and had commanded great publicity
through his cases and trial tactics.6 8 The court readily found Ratner to be a
limited purpose public figure with respect to the trial69 in that along with
Kunstler, she showed up at the trial uninvited and "took over the defense of
one of the defendants .... attempted to try the issues in the news media as
well as the courtroom" and pursued "scorched earth [tactics] all the way"
including outbursts of shouting in the courtroom by the lawyers. 70 The
court's analysis seems wholly consistent with Gertz; indeed on the limited
public figure issue this case would appear to be a textbook example of how a
trial lawyer could move beyond the more traditional role of courtroom advo-
cate and attempt to influence the outcome of a public controversy surround-
ing a trial through the news media.
Cases involving attorneys engaged in areas of practice other than litigation
have also reached divergent results. Apparently, an attorney does not be-
come a public figure simply by incurring professional disciplinary sanctions.
In Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co.7 1 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held
that an attorney who was suspended from practice for a year and required to
take the bar examination to obtain reinstatement was not a public figure.
72
Relying on Gertz and Firestone, the court noted that the plaintiff had made
no attempt to influence any public controversy. 73 In Littlefield v. Fort Dodge
65. 23 Cal. App. at 387, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
66. 465 F. Supp. 386 (D.C.V.I. 1979).
67. Id. at 399.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 397, 399; see also Hayes v. Booth, Inc., 97 Mich. App. 758, 295 N.W.2d 858,
865-66 (1980) (plaintiff defense attorney in murder case conceded he was public figure; how-
ever, the court noted that it would have found him to be limited purpose public figure for
purposes of the public controversy surrounding the trial in view of his frequent outbursts at the
judge as well as his affirmative steps to attract media attention); cf. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l,
754 F.2d 1072, 1084-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985) (plaintiff probably would
not have been public figure based on his reputation and expertise as drug trafficking defense
attorney alone but became public figure as result of his own indictment for drug trafficking as
well as his association with motorcycle gang involved in drug trafficking); Gilberg v, Goffi, 21
A.D.2d 517, 251 N.Y.S.2d 23, 31 (1964) (mayor's law firm accused of engaging in conflict of
interest is public figure).
70. 465 F. Supp. at 390-91.
71. 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979); see also Marchiondo v. Tribune Co., 98 N.M.
282, 648 P.2d 321 (1982) (prominent practicing attorney with political connections is not pub-
lic figure).
72. 590 S.W.2d at 844.
73. Id. Ryder v. Time, Inc., 557 F.2d 824 (D.D.C. 1976), another defamation case involv-
ing a question of attorney discipline, presented but did not clearly resolve the interesting issue
of who may be a public figure when the press defamatorily misidentifies the plaintiff as some-
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Messenger74 the court of appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached the same
result on fairly similar facts.75 Wolston supports these results since it holds
that conviction for a criminal offense alone does not convert a person into a
public figure.
76
In Bandelin v. Pietsch,77 however, the Idaho Supreme Court found that an
attorney charged with contempt with regard to his actions as guardian of an
estate was a public figure. 78 Although the court placed some reliance on his
former notoriety as a state legislator, it essentially concluded that he was a
limited purpose public figure with respect to the guardianship proceeding as
a result of the judge's criticism of him despite the fact that he did not volun-
tarily pursue public acclaim. 79 While perhaps someone like Bandelin should
be considered a public figure as a matter of policy, the court's holding and
analysis seems to be inconsistent with the Gertz Court's emphasis on a vol-
untary attempt to influence a public controversy through the media, espe-
cially in a legal context.
C. Litigants as Public Figures
Just as Gertz addressed the question of whether a court should consider an
attorney involved in litigation to be a public figure, Time, Inc. v. Firestone8°
considered whether a court should characterize a litigant, in this case the
plaintiff in a highly publicized divorce trial, as a public figure. 81 Firestone
involved the divorce trial of a socially prominent and extremely wealthy
Palm Beach couple. Apparently, some of the testimony was quite titillating.
The Court found that Mary Alice Firestone, the plaintiff in both the divorce
and the defamation proceedings, was not a public figure. 82 Relying on Gertz,
it first observed that she had "not assume[d] any role of especial prominence
one else. In Ryder the bar had disciplined an attorney named Richard R. Ryder. Defendant
Time magazine published an essay discussing the case identifying the lawyer without a middle
initial. Another Virginia attorney named Richard J. Ryder sued claiming that the article de-
famed him. Id. at 824-25. The court found the plaintiff to be a private figure. Id. at 826. This
approach would seem to be correct under Gertz, which emphasizes the degree to which a
particular plaintiff needs and deserves protection. Of course the Gertz Court was not focusing
on the misidentification problem. The press would surely argue that in a case like Ryder, it
was not even aware that the actual plaintiff existed. In determining whether the press is writ-
ing about a private figure and probably subject to a stricter standard of care, the court can only
focus on the subject of the article.
74. 614 F.2d 581 (8th Cir.), cert.denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980).
75. Id. at 584. The court relied heavily on Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976),
and noted that the attorney plaintiff's voluntary practice of law in violation of his probation
did not transform him into a public figure since he did not appear to be attempting to influence
a public controversy. Id.
76. 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979); See infra notes 111-129 and accompanying text.
77. 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977).
78. 563 P.2d at 398.
79. Id; see also Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So. 2d 72, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1986) (attorney who was criticized as trustee of large be-
quest to private university, and who filed suit on behalf of estate of donor to revoke the gift was
limited purpose public figure).
80. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
81. Id. at 452-57.
82. Id. at 453-55.
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in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society .... -83 In
other words, she was not a public figure for all purposes. The Court then
concluded that she was not a limited purpose public figure either because the
"[d]issolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of
'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties
of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the
reading public."'8 4 The Court went on to note that in any event, she would
not qualify as a limited purpose public figure since she had not voluntarily
chosen "to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married life [because]
[s]he was compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal re-
lease from the bonds of matrimony."85 The fact that she had held a few
press conferences did not transform her into a limited purpose public figure
since a court should not assume that they did or were intended to have any
impact on the resolution of the judicial proceedings.8 6 This conclusion may
well follow on the record before the Court. One could surely imagine a case,
however, in which a litigant was in fact attempting to influence the outcome
of the litigation itself or at least a public controversy involved in the litiga-
tion through press conferences or other communication with the media.
Such an attempt would probably be a decisive factor leading to a conclusion
that the plaintiff was a public figure.
Like Gertz, Firestone clearly embraces the policy that even though they
may have initiated legal proceedings, people should not forfeit the protection
of their reputation simply because they have become involved in those legal
proceedings.87 The Court obviously does not want to adopt a rule that
might discourage people from asserting their legal rights through the judicial
process, although it is certainly open to question whether any person would
take account of this consideration in deciding whether to file a lawsuit.
It is not entirely clear how broadly one should read Firestone with respect
to the voluntary nature of the plaintiff's conduct in initiating litigation. In
concluding that Ms. Firestone had little meaningful choice other than to go
to court in order to obtain a divorce, the Court quoted from Boddie v. Con-
necticut 88 where it had reached the same conclusion in a case invalidating
the filing fees for indigents in divorce cases. 89 In subsequent filing fee cases
the Court has distinguished Boddie, emphasizing that it turned on the con-
stitutional significance of the marital relationship and the state's monopoly
over its legal dissolution. 90 The Court could distinguish Firestone on the
same grounds in a subsequent case, although it is quite likely that it would
83. Id. at 453.
84. Id. at 454. This is an important point, and it is considered in more detail below. See
infra notes 137-155 and accompanying text.
85. 424 U.S. at 454.
86. Id. at 454 n.3.
87. Id. at 454.
88. 401 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1971).
89. Id.
90. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (distinguishing judicial review of admin-




not because it seems intent on construing the public figure doctrine
narrowly.
Since Firestone few cases have raised the question of whether the plaintiff
in a legal proceeding is a public figure.9 1 In Tomson v. Stephan92 a federal
district court quite correctly concluded that a woman who had filed and
subsequently settled a sexual harassment suit against the State Attorney
General, who was then a candidate for governor, was not a public figure.
93
In the leading case of Street v. National Broadcasting Co.,9 4 the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that one of the prosecuting victims of an
alleged rape in the famous Scottsboro case of the 1930s was and still re-
mained a public figure some thirty years later. 95 Given that the Scottsboro
cases created a nationwide debate on the fairness of criminal procedure in
the South to black defendants and given that they ultimately resulted in the
landmark constitutional decision on the right to counsel,96 the court cor-
rectly concluded that the Scottsboro trial involved a public controversy.
97 It
pointed out both that the plaintiff played a particularly prominent role in the
controversy as one of the two victims and the major witness and that she had
had effective access to the channels of communication. 98 Still, the court rec-
ognized that the question of whether she had voluntarily thrust herself into
the controversy under the holdings of Gertz and Firestone was trouble-
some.99 Citing Firestone, the court acknowledged that "[i]t cannot be said
that a rape victim 'voluntarily' injects herself into a criminal prosecution for
rape".1°° The court went on to conclude that this would only be the case if
91. At least three cases have held that a person does not become a public figure simply by
being a witness in a lawsuit. See Nelson v. Associated Press, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1468, 1472-73
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (witness who testified under subpoena in highly publicized divorce trial is not
public figure); Dresbach v. Doubleday, 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (D.D.C. 1981) (boy did not
become public figure by testifying in a trial where his brother was charged with murdering
their parents); Wilhoit v. WCSC, Inc., 293 S.C. 34, 358 S.E.2d 397, 401 (Ct. App. 1987) (plain-
tiff did not become character witness in embezzlement trial). These cases would seem to be
clearly controlled by Firestone, if not by Wolston. In Lemmer v. Arkansas Gazette, 620 F.
Supp. 1332, 1334-35 (E.D. Ark. 1985), the court found that a person who testified at the trial
of members of Vietnam Veterans against the War was a public figure with respect to the public
controversy surrounding that organization. The court relied on the plaintiff's antiwar activi-
ties and F.B.I. informant status. In Friedgood v. Peters Publishing, 13 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1479, 1480 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1986), the court found that the plaintiff was a public figure with
respect to the public controversy concerning the murder of her mother and conviction of her
father where she talked with the police, talked with attorneys, concealed evidence, and ulti-
mately testified in court against her father. Id. at 1489. Although the court relied on several
factors beyond her trial testimony, none of them seem qualitatively different from the type of
behavior that was insufficient in Gertz and Firestone. Accordingly, the case seems inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent.
92. 699 F. Supp. 860 (D. Kan. 1988).
93. Id. at 867. The plaintiff's participation in a press conference at the defendant's re-
quest and for the defendant's benefit did not transform her into a public figure.
94. 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981).
95. Id. at 1233-36.
96. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1942).
97. 645 F.2d at 1234.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.; see Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, 734-
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she had in fact been a rape victim. 101 If she had fabricated the charges as the
defense and others had argued, then in fact she would have voluntarily in-
jected herself into a public controversy. 102 Since the court believed that the
issues of public figure status and truth were so closely linked and since it
believed that the press was entitled to guidance on the public figure issue
prior to the resolution of the issue of truth in the defamation proceeding, it
simply concluded that one must disregard the voluntary injection element in
such a case.103
Considering that this conundrum might not be so unusual in defamation
cases involving the reporting of legal proceedings, it is hardly clear that the
Supreme Court would agree with this analysis. The Sixth Circuit was not
required to stand fully behind this theory, however, since it went on to find
that the plaintiff had voluntarily thrust herself into the controversy beyond
her role in the trial itself by giving press interviews and "aggressively
promot[ing] her version of the case outside of her actual courtroom testi-
mony."' 1 4 This may be enough to reconcile the decision with Firestone. In
Street, unlike Firestone, the outcome of the trial itself rested on a larger pub-
lic controversy, that is, whether justice was done or even whether justice
could possibly be done in the 1930s South in a case like Scottsboro. 10 5 Pre-
sumably the plaintiff tried to influence this larger controversy through her
public comments. It might have been even easier for the court to reconcile
its decision with Gertz and Firestone by concluding that, even assuming she
had been raped, the case was in fact one of those rare instances of the invol-
untary public figure. Giving her every benefit of the doubt, perhaps through
no fault of her own, she was simply caught up in one of the cases of the
century. That being so, the public interest in information would simply limit
the degree of protection of reputation to which she might otherwise have
been entitled.
The court also concluded that she remained a public figure some thirty
years later, because historians are also in need of first amendment protection
against defamation, and the public controversy over the Scottsboro trial re-
mained alive. 106 Neither the principle nor its application seems particularly
troublesome in view of the notoriety and continuing interest in the Scotts-
boro case and the evolution of southern racial justice. At some point, how-
ever, its application to a case of lesser magnitude could present problems.
In Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer 10 7 the Washington Court of Ap-
35 (1985) (court assumed without discussion that rape victim was private figure with respect to
article reporting rape trial).
101. 645 F.2d at 1234.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1235.
105. Id. at 1235-36.
106. Id. at 1236.
107. 45 Wash. App. 29, 723 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987); see
also Dileo v. Koltnow, 613 P.2d 318, 322 (Colo. 1980) (discharged police officer who filed




peals held that two women, each of whom had filed approximately ten public
interest lawsuits and had tried to influence the public on the issues involved
through letters to the editor, press releases, and participation at public meet-
ings, were limited purpose public figures with respect to a discussion of over-
crowded court dockets and nuisance suits.1 0 8 The court noted that it could
draw no clear line between the subject matter of the plaintiffs lawsuits and
the abuse of the litigation process.'°9 The case seems easily consistent with
Gertz and Firestone. Indeed, the plaintiffs in Camer would appear to be
textbook examples of Gertz conception of the limited purpose public figure
using all means available to attempt to influence the outcome of public
controversies.
In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, as pointed out above, 0 the
Court held that a man who had failed to appear before a Grand Jury investi-
gating Soviet espionage and who subsequently pleaded guilty to a charge of
criminal contempt and received a suspended one year sentence was not a
public figure."' At the outset, the Court noted that no contention that the
plaintiff was an all purpose public figure arose." 2 Assuming that a public
controversy regarding the propriety of law enforcement methods for dealing
with Soviet espionage existed, the Court concluded that rather than volunta-
rily injecting himself into it, "petitioner was dragged unwillingly into the
controversy."' '3 Given that the plaintiff did not discuss the matter with the
press and only took such actions as were necessary to defend himself, the
mere fact that a court cited him for criminal contempt did not transform
him into a public figure." 4 The Court emphasized that this was not a case
in which an individual voluntarily incurred a citation of contempt in order
to make a political statement.' '5 Rather, the plaintiff simply failed to answer
the subpoena due to poor health. 16 Finally, the Court decisively rejected
the contention "that any person who engages in criminal conduct automati-
cally becomes a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range of
issues relating to his conviction.
'"' 17
Wolston contains many potentially limiting facts that could cause it to be
read quite narrowly. Arguably, a person who has committed or been
charged with a crime, or who has become involved in circumstances that the
public has the right to know about in great detail has voluntarily taken ac-
tion that should result in a reduction of his protection of reputation. Most
courts have followed, with little detailed analysis, the broad implications of
Wolston, however, and concluded that a criminal defendant or a person who
108. 723 P.2d at 1195-96.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
111. 443 U.S. 157, 168 (1979).
112. Id. at 165.
113. Id. at 166.
114. Id. at 167.





has been indicted or arrested is not a public figure.1 18
Exceptions, however, exist. In Ruebke v. Globe Communications the Kan-
sas Supreme Court held that an individual being tried (and subsequently
convicted) for the brutal murder of two small children and their babysitter
was a limited purpose public figure under the Wolston analysis with respect
to the controversy surrounding the crime. 1 9 The Kansas court read Wol-
ston to stand for the proposition that a criminal defendant does not automat-
ically become a public figure but certainly can become one if he otherwise
satisfies the requirements of Gertz. 120 This analysis is doubtlessly correct.
In applying the Gertz criteria to the facts, the court emphasized the espe-
cially heinous nature of the crime, noting that it was a matter of great public
concern. 12 1 It concluded that the combination of the intense media coverage
that ultimately focused on the plaintiff, the plaintiff's voluntary act of turn-
ing himself in, and his arrest and indictment for the murders combined to
render him a public figure. 122 Given the nature of the crimes and the degree
of publicity, the court was probably correct in concluding that the plaintiff
was an involuntary public figure for purposes of the controversy, 123 although
the case could be limited to is facts. Similarly, in Scottsdale Publishing v.
118. Law Firm of Daniel Foster v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., 844 F.2d 955, 959 (2d Cir.
1988) (law firm located at address where F.B.I. conducted search for terrorist activity was
private figure involved in matter of public concern under New York law); Mills v. Kingsport
Times-News, 475 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (D. W. Va. 1979) (defendant in murder trial was not
public figure); Dalitz v. Penthouse, 168 Cal. App. 3d 468, 214 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1985) (plaintiff
was not public figure on basis of fifteen-year old securities law conviction); Jennings v. Tele-
gram-Tribune, 164 Cal. App. 3d 119, 210 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1985) (person who pleaded guilty to
tax charge was not public figure); Western Broadcasting v. Wright, 182 Ga. App. 359, 356
S.E.2d 53 (1987) (attorney who was indicted and acquitted on charge of aiding client's tax
evasion was not public figure); Newell v. Field Enters., 91 111. App. 2d 735, 415 N.E.2d 434,
449 (1980) (defendant in civil wrongful death action was not public figure); Jones v. Taibbi,
400 Mass. 786, 512 N.E.2d 260 (1987) (suspect in highly publicized serial murder investigation
was private figure); Rouch v. Enquirer, 407 Mich. 157, 398 N.W.2d 245 (1986) (assuming man
arrested for rape of babysitter was private figure); Jacobsen v. Rochester Communications, 410
N.W.2d 830, 835 (Minn. 1987) (defendant in arson case who gave interview to press on day
appellate court reversed his conviction was private figure); Grobe v. Three Herald Village, 69
A.D.2d 175, 420 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1979) (man who filed plea similar to guilty plea to charge of
criminal harassment was not public figure; however, disposition of the charges was matter of
public concern); Burgess v. Reformer Publications, 146 Vt. 612, 508 A.2d 1359 (1986) (plain-
tiff subpoenaed before grand jury with respect to embezzlement investigation was private fig-
ure); LaMon v. Butler, 44 Wash. App. 654, 722 P.2d 1373 (1986), aff'd, I10 Wash. 2d 216,
751 P.2d 842 (1988) (person convicted of assault was not public figure). In Orr v. Argus-Press
Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1116 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979), the court held that
an attorney indicted for fraud was a public figure. The court, however, relied primarily on his
attempts to publicly promote his failed shopping center rather than on his indictment. This
decision seems quite consistent with Gertz and Firestone. Likewise, in Logan v. District of
Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.D.C. 1978), the court held that a criminal defendant was a
public figure because he had gotten caught in a police sting operation after claiming to be a
murderer and volunteering to be a hitman. Id. at 1331.
119. 241 Kan. 595, 738 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1987).
120. 738 P.2d at 1252.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Donaldson v. Washington Post Co., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1436, 1440
(D.C. Super. Ct. 1977) (criminal defendant charged with exhorting other defendant to kill
youth who was helping bus driver collect fares in highly publicized "Good Samaritan" murder
trial is public figure); cf Yancey v. Hamilton, 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1012, 1016 (Ky. 1989)
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Superior Court,124 the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a notorious crimi-
nal who testified about a celebrated murder under a grant of immunity was a
public figure. 125 In distinguishing Wolston 126 the court pointed out that the
plaintiff was not a minor figure dragged before the grand jury but rather was
a major organized crime figure who chose to testify in detail about a matter
of the greatest public concern. 127 Finally, the court noted that the plaintiff
was not simply an ordinary criminal but a man who admitted to having
committed over one hundred serious crimes.128 As with Ruebke, the court's
conclusion seems clearly and correctly distinguishable from Wolston.
If a person does not become a public figure simply because a court has
convicted or tried him, or police have charged or arrested him, then it
should follow that one does not assume public figure status simply by being
the focus of a criminal investigation. 129 In Trans World Accounts v. Associ-
ated Press,'30 however, a federal district court held that a company that was
the subject of a Federal Trade Commission investigation and press release
announcing the intention to file a complaint alleging unfair trade practices
against the plaintiff was a public figure.' 3 1 The court conceded that the com-
pany was not an all purpose public figure, nor had it voluntarily injected
itself into a public controversy. 132 Rather, the court concluded that the pro-
ceedings had drawn the company into a public controversy and hence the
company became a public figure by engaging in the underlying business
practices that the Federal Trade Commission had decided to investigate.'
3 3
In other words, the court seemed to hold that the plaintiff had become an
involuntary public figure. The court emphasized the fact that Federal Trade
Commission deliberately attempted to use adverse publicity to coerce busi-
nesses into settling.' 34 The court's conclusions seem quite inconsistent with
both the letter and spirit of Gertz and Firestone despite its attempts to read
these cases narrowly.' 35 The decision seems even more inconsistent with
(question of fact as to whether plaintiff became limited purpose public figure by confessing to
murder).
124. 159 Ariz. 72, 764 P.2d 1131 (Ct. App. 1988).




129. See KARK-TV v. Simon, 280 Ark. 228, 656 S.W.2d 702 (1983) (person detained by
police for investigation of robbery is not public figure); Melon v. Capital City Press, 407 So. 2d
85 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (person arrested on drug charges is not public figure); Port Packett
Corp. v. Lewis, 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, 735, 740 (1985) (assuming parents investigated for
death of child due to abuse are private figures); Burgess v. Reformer Publishing Co., 146 Vt.
612, 508 A.2d 1359 (1986) (treasurer of organization involved in embezzlement investigation is
not public figure simply because grand jury summoned him to testify).
130. 425 F. Supp. 814 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
131. Id. at 819-21.
132. Id. at 820.
133. Id. at 820-21.
134. Id. at 820.
135. To distinguish Gertz and Firestone, the court contrasted the private nature of the pro-
ceedings in those cases with the public nature of the proceedings and the government entity
involved in the case before the court. This rationale seems more akin to public interest focus of
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1970), than to the plaintiff's voluntary conduct em-
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Wolsion, which the Supreme Court decided the following year. Conse-
quently, Trans World is weak precedent.
D. Legal Affairs as Matters of Public Controversy
Prior to Gertz, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 136 Justice Brennan's, plural-
ity opinion took the position that the actual malice standard of fault should
apply whenever the defamatory statements in question dealt with a matter of
public interest, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a public figure.137 In
that case the plaintiff was a distributor of magazines who was caught up in a
raid on a newsstand for obscene literature. 38 The plurality argued that
under the First Amendment the public had an interest in knowing about
issues of significance whether or not the participants qualified as public
figures. 139 The matter of public interest approach of Rosenbloom never com-
manded a majority of the Court, but lower courts followed and applied it
until Gertz was decided four years later.14° Gertz decisively rejected this ap-
proach under the rationale that it would provide too little protection for
reputation and that it would be too difficult for judges to decide on an ad hoc
basis what is and is not a matter of public interest. 4 1 At the same time
however, the Court in Gertz declared that a person becomes a limited pur-
pose public figure by voluntarily injecting himself into a public contro-
versy.' 42 Firestone emphasized the significance of the public controversy
concept when it concluded that the plaintiff's highly publicized divorce trial
was not "the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz."' 43 In his
dissent, Justice Marshall charged that through the public controversy re-
quirement the Court was reviving the type of Rosenbloom public interest
analysis that it had purportedly rejected in Gertz. 44
Justice Marshall is certainly correct in noting that both the public contro-
versy and matter of public interest analyses focus on subject matter rather
than participants, and that both will necessarily require judicial definition by
way of inclusion and exclusion. But public controversy is clearly intended to
be a far narrower concept than matter of public interest. Furthermore, pub-
lic controversy plays a much more limited role in the analysis. Under the
phasis of Gertz and Firestone. While Gertz did suggest that it would be theoretically possible to
become a public figure involuntarily, it left no doubt that that would be a rarity. 418 U.S. at
325-28. Under the Transworld court's analysis, anyone charged with a public offense by a
governmental agency presumably forfeits the protection of private figure status.
136. 403 U.S. 29 (1970).
137. Id. at 43-44.
138. Id. at 32-35.
139. Id. at 40-45.
140. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 377 n.10 (providing an extensive list of cases applying the
Rosenbloom public interest test).
141. Id. at 345-46. For the argument that the court should explicitly focus on content by
requiring plaintiffs to meet the actual malice standard when the statements in issue relate to
matters of self-government as well as when the plaintiff is a public figure or a public official, see
Franklin, Constitutional Libel Law: The Role of Content, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1657 (1987).
142. 418 U.S. at 345.
143. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 487 (1976).
144. Id. at 484, 487-88.
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Rosenbloom plurality approach, matter of public interest is the determina-
tive factor with respect to the standard of fault.' 45 If the issue is a matter of
public interest, the actual malice standard applies. Public controversy, how-
ever, is only a part of the method for determining whether a person is a
limited purpose public figure. Finally, the courts seem intent on applying
the concept of public controversy in a literal manner. Apparently there
must be an actual controversy virtually in the form of a debate.' 46 It is not
enough that it is simply a subject of some interest. Moreover, it must be a
debate in which the public, as opposed to the private parties in a lawsuit, is
participating. 1
4 7
The difference between the two concepts is clearly illustrated by cases in-
volving legal proceedings. As noted above, Firestone held that the plaintiff's
highly publicized divorce was not a public controversy.' 48 Other cases have
followed that lead. In Levine v. CMP, Publications, Inc., for instance, the
court of appeals for the fifth circuit held that a corporate unfair competition
lawsuit did not present a public controversy.' 49 Firestone does not suggest
that litigation can never involve a public controversy. As the court in
Ratner v. Young held, for instance, a mass murder trial with racial and polit-
ical overtones that arose out of an incident that had a "devastating effect on
the economy of the [Virgin] Islands" quite clearly involved a public contro-
versy. 150 The public debate, however, must precede and transcend the litiga-
tion itself.
Since Gertz, a few jurisdictions have adopted a matter of public interest
approach for determining either when to apply the actual malice standard,
5 1
145. 403 U.S. at 43-44.
146. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 n.8 (1978); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976).
147. Id.; Waldman v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 898 (1980). In a different context the Court held that a report by a credit agency
concerning a private business was not a matter of public concern, and therefore, a jury could
award presumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet
v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985). To what extent the decision turned on the means
of communication and the limited nature of the intended audience as opposed to the nature of
the subject matter itself is not entirely clear.
148. 424 U.S. at 454-55.
149. 738 F.2d 660, 672 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Davis v. Keystone Printing, 111 Ill. App.
3d 427, 444 N.E.2d 253 (1982) (charges of tax fraud and encouraging violations of federal law
were not public controversies).
150. 465 F. Supp. 386, 400 (D.V.I. 1978). Likewise, in Street v. National Broadcasting
Co., 645 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981), the court had no difficulty
concluding that the Scottsboro trial, one of the most infamous cases in American legal history,
was a public controversy considering that it gave rise to "a major public debate over the ability
of our courts to render even-handed justice." Id. at 1234. See also Joseph v. Xerox Corp., 594
F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C. 1984) (dispute over whether members of the public can adequately rep-
resent themselves before courts and administrative agencies is public controversy); Della-
Donna v. Gore Newspapers, 489 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1088 (1987) (dispute over a fifteen million dollar gift to college is public controversy); Bandelin
v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395, 398, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977) (dispute over
guardianship is public controversy).
151. See, e.g., Diversified Management v. Denver Post, 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo. 1982) (apply-
ing objective version of reckless disregard standard to matters of public interest); Aafco Heat-
ing & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671, 321 N.E.2d
580, 585-86 (1974) (reckless disregard standard applies to matter of public concern); Sisler v.
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or at least when to apply a standard such as New York's "gross irresponsi-
bility" standard' 52 that is more rigorous than negligence. Courts applying
such a standard find consistently that legal proceedings, especially criminal
charges and proceedings, are matters of public interest. 15 3 As a practical
matter, the courts seem to take the position that virtually anything that is
either interesting to the public or at least anything which should be of legiti-
mate interest to the public is covered. 154 Since courts and investigative agen-
cies are part of the government applying or enforcing the law, it is easy to
conclude that the concerns of the courts and the police are necessarily the
concerns of the public at large. Many such matters would hardly qualify as
public controversies under Gertz and Firestone since no preexisting interest,
much less debate on the issues at hand would exist. Under Gertz and Fire-
stone, the Court construed the concept of the public controversy narrowly in
cases involving press coverage of legal proceedings. While this may arguably
Gannett Co., Inc., 104 N.J. 256, 516 A.2d 1083, 1095 (1986) (reckless disregard standard
applied to private person engaged in conduct he could reasonably expect implicates legitimate
public interest).
152. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer Dispatch, 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571,
379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) (applying "gross irresponsibility" standard to matters "arguably
within the sphere of legitimate public concern").
153. See, e.g., Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1113 (6th Cir. 1978) (indictment of
attorney for fraud regarding collapse of shopping center is matter of public interest), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Chang v. Michiana Telecasting Corp., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1889, 1904 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (civil suit involving charges of trade secret misappropriation is a
matter of public interest); Dougherty v. Capitol Cities Communications, Inc., 631 F. Supp.
1566, 1570-72 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (criminal investigation of bankruptcy courts is matter of
public interest under Michigan law); Gay v. Williams, 486 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D. Alaska 1979)
(criminal investigation of drug smuggling and organized crime is matter of public interest
under Alaska law); Diversified Management v. Denver Post, 653 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Colo. 1982)
(federal investigation of companies financial dealings is matter of public concern); Hatjioannou
v. Tribune Co., 3 Fla. Supp. 2d 143 (Cir. Ct. 1982) (law enforcement is matter of public con-
cern for purposes of the privilege of neutral reportage); Rouch v. Enquirer, 427 Mich. 157,
203-04, 398 N.W.2d 245, 266 (1986) (report of arrest is matter of public interest); Kurtz v.
Evening News Ass'n, 144 Mich. App. 205, 375 N.W.2d 391, 395 (1985) (filing of charges
against attorney for attack on police officer is matter of public interest); Peisner v. Detroit Free
Press, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 153, 266 N.W.2d 693, 697-98 (1978) (attorney's appeal of murder
case is matter of public interest); Berryman v. Clark, 12 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1310, 1311
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1985) (subject of prisoner lawsuits and their effect on judicial system is matter
of public concern); Merrill v. Monthly Detroit City Magazines, 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1994
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1983) (magazine article referring to indicted underworld figure is matter of
public interest); Jacobsen v. Rochester Communications, 410 N.W.2d 830, 836 n.7 (Minn.
1987) (criminal trial is matter of public concern); Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc.,
38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d 569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) (arrest of high school
teacher on drug charge is matter of public concern); Pollnow v. Poughkeepsie Newspapers,
107 A.D.2d 10, 486 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1985) (criminal assault case against youth is a matter of
public concern), aff'd, 67 N.Y.2d 778, 492 N.E.2d 125, 501 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1986); Brown v.
Johnston Newspapers Corp., 84 A.D.2d 636, 444 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (1981) (arrest for assault
is matter of public concern); Robart v. Post Standard, 74 A.D.2d 964, 425 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892
(1980) (issuance of ticket involved criminal justice system and as such is matter of public
concern). But see Nabkey v. Booth Newspapers, 140 Mich. App. 507, 364 N.W.2d 363 (1985)
(report about plaintiff being arrested for stealing court records and assaulting prosecutor with
a pen is not matter of public interest but merely "interesting and amusing reading").
154. See Gaeta v. New York News, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 340, 349, 465 N.E.2d 802, 805, 477
N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (1984) ("the need for judgment and discretion to be exercised by journalists,
subject only to review by the courts to protect against clear abuses; determining what editorial
content is of legitimate public interest and concern is a function for editors .... ").
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cramp press coverage of the judicial process somewhat, it is consistent with
and indeed essential to the Court's attempt to strike a more adequate accom-
modation between protection of reputation and the interest of the public and
the press in uninhibited reporting.
E. A Judicial Proceedings Privilege?
In his dissent in Firestone Justice Brennan was prepared to extend the
logic of Rosenbloom a step further by concluding that the Court should con-
sider judicial proceedings to be matters of public interest to which the actual
malice standard must apply as a matter of law.' 55 Relying on Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn 156 and other Supreme Court precedents, 157 Justice
Brennan argued that such a judicial proceedings privilege should exist given
the public nature of judicial proceedings, the public need to obtain informa-
tion about the courts as a significant organ of the government, and the im-
portant role of the media in reporting judicial proceedings to the public.' 5 8
Courts are indeed an integral part of the government and the application of
the law and administration of justice should be subjects of the highest impor-
tance to the public.' 59 As Justice Brennan noted in his Firestone dissent, the
Meiklejohn theory of freedom of expression, 16° which provides the primary
philosophical and theoretical foundation for New York Times v. Sullivan,'
61
and much of the Supreme Court's other free speech jurisprudence as well,
places speech regarding governmental affairs at the very core of First
Amendment protection.'
62
At the time the Court decided Firestone several Supreme Court cases em-
phasized the importance of public access to information concerning the judi-
cial process.' 6 3  This policy has assumed even greater constitutional
significance following the landmark decision in Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia. 164 There, the Court held that the public, including the press, had
155. 424 U.S. 448, 471-81 (1976).
156. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
157. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
158. 424 U.S. at 474-81.
159. Justice Brennan stated:
The Court has emphasized that the central meaning of the free expression guar-
antee is that the body politic of this Nation shall be entitled to the communica-
tions necessary for self-governance, and that to place restraints on the exercise of
expression is to deny the instrumental means required in order that the citizenry
exercise that ultimate sovereignty reposed in its collective judgement by the
Constitution.
Id. at 441.
160. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245 (1961).
See generally, A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948).
161. 376 U.S. 254, 270-81 (1964).
162. Shortly after New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan, the author of the opinion,
delivered a speech discussing the influence of Meiklejohn's theory on Supreme Court precedent
including Sullivan. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); see also Kalven, The New York Times Case. A
Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 245 (1964).
163. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
164. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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a First Amendment right to attend criminal trials. 165 It explained that pub-
lic access to criminal trials serves several important functions, including the
assurance of fairness, 166 the discouragement of perjury and misconduct, 167
provision for a catharsis for public outrage,1 68 and education of the public
about the operation of the judicial system in general and in a particular
case. 169 With respect to the last policy, the Court noted that "it would be
difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and impor-
tance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are con-
ducted." 1 70 The Court has since extended the principle of Richmond
Newspapers beyond criminal trial proper. 17 1 Thus, it is clear that the need
for public access to information about legal proceedings and the justice sys-
tem is a consideration of special significance under the First Amendment.
As Justice Brennan argued in his Firestone dissent, the case for a constitu-
tional judicial proceedings privilege is bolstered not simply by the impor-
tance of the subject matter but by the arguably greater likelihood of error
with respect to matters with significant defamatory potential. 172 In covering
the courts the press will often report allegations of criminal conduct' 73 un-
ethical behavior, 174 or misconduct such as the adultery charges in Fire-
stone. 175 Moreover, reporters covering legal affairs and proceedings must
often attempt to decipher and explain complex and technical legal language
under deadline pressure which tends to increase the potential for defamatory
error. 176 Even so, the case for a constitutional judicial proceedings privilege
would be weak unless a reason exists to believe that the absence of a privilege
would deter the press from covering judicial proceedings vigorously because
of a perceived increased threat of liability or at least of litigation. Conse-
quently, Justice Brennan argued that the application of the less protective
negligence standard of fault would inevitably "chill" press coverage of legal
proceedings. 1
77
The majority in Firestone emphatically rejected Justice Brennan's plea for
a constitutional judicial proceedings privilege.178 It acknowledged that judi-
cial proceedings often involve matters of great public significance. 179 It also
concluded, however, that many judicial proceedings involve matters of
165. Id. at 569.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 571.
168. Id. at 572.
169. Id. at 575.
170. Id.
171. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (pretrial proceedings); Press-Enters. Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (voir dire proceedings); Globe Newspapers Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 448 U.S. 596 (1982) (testimony of minor victim in sex offense case).
172. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 111-136 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 71-73, 77-79 and accompanying text.
175. The facts of Firestone are an appropriate illustration. See infra notes 308-319 and
accompanying text.
176. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
177. 424 U.S. at 471, 474.
178. Id. at 455-57.
179. Id. at 454.
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purely private concern to the parties.180 To the extent that matters of public
concern are involved, the Court believed that the privilege recognized in Cox
Broadcasting v. Cohn, 181 which provides the press with complete protection
against liability for the republication of "truthful information contained in
official court records open to public inspection," is more than adequate to
serve this interest. 182 By definition, Justice Brennan's privilege would pro-
tect false as opposed to truthful reports of judicial proceedings.18 3 Arguably
this would undermine rather than further the public's interest in learning
about the business of the courts. 18 4 Furthermore, such a categorical subject
matter oriented approach would constitute at least a limited return to the
Rosenbloom matter of public interest analysis that the Court had previously
rejected because it was insufficiently protective of the state interest in reputa-
tion. 185 A privilege for reports of judicial proceedings, even if limited to
what actually happens in the courtroom, would seem quite inconsistent with
the Court's participant-oriented public figure approach. 186 As the Court
recognized, such a privilege might well require overturning Gertz itself. 187
The Court rejected the Rosenbloom public interest approach in part be-
cause of its concern that a judicial determination of what constitutes the
public interest would be too ad hoc and unpredictable.188 A limited excep-
tion for judicial proceedings would not necessarily threaten the Court's gen-
eral resistance to that approach since it would appear easily applicable.
Nevertheless, the Court maintained that even such a limited exception
would upset the proper balance between protection of vigorous press cover-
age and the individual's interest in reputation. 189
Perhaps the Court's primary problem with a judicial proceedings privilege
stemmed from its conclusion that it would insufficiently protect the reputa-
tional interests of private figure plaintiffs involved often somewhat involun-
tarily in legal proceedings. 190 To some extent, the Court seemed concerned
that fear of not being able to protect their reputations against defamatory
assaults by the press could deter people from enforcing their rights or honor-
ing their obligations through the legal process. 191 This is of course a possi-
bility in an individual case, but as a general rule it would seem that few
180. Id. at 455-57.
181. 420 U.S. 469 (1975); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L. Ed. 2d 443
(1989); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
182. 424 U.S. at 455.
183. 424 U.S. at 473.
184. Id. at 457. Rightly or wrongly, New York Times v. Sullivan, as well as the rest of the
Supreme Court's First Amendment case law in the defamation area, is based on the assump-
tion that the press is in need of a certain degree of "strategic" protection for defamatory false-
hood in order to prevent self-censorship of truthful information. For a recent critical analysis
of the case, see Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong? 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 782
(1986).
185. 424 U.S. at 456.
186. Id. at 456-57.
187. Id. at 457.
188. Id. at 456.
189. Id.




people would choose to forfeit the benefits or incur the harm that would
often result from foregoing recourse to the legal process simply because of
the rather remote possibility that the press might defame them. Rather, the
Court really seemed to believe that it would simply be unfair to force people
largely to relinquish protection of their reputation in order to engage in ac-
tivity that they may be wholly unable to avoid and which often may be
highly beneficial both to the individual and society.192
Ultimately the debate over the necessity for a judicial proceedings privi-
lege focuses on the gap between the stringent actual malice and the more
lenient negligence standard of fault. In a sense, the Court has painted itself
into a corner by rendering the actual malice standard so difficult to meet that
it is loath to extend it beyond its existing domain for fear that it would un-
fairly undermine the interest in protecting reputation. On the other hand,
the press sees the negligence standard as too lenient and too unpredictable to
provide sufficient protection for vigorous reporting.1 93 I have argued else-
where that at least over time the courts, in reliance on the standards of the
journalism profession itself, will apply the negligence standard with sufficient
clarity and consistency to overcome the problem of vagueness.194 Even
where some uncertainty as to the meaning of journalistic negligence in a
particular area exists, one can reasonably assume that the press will gener-
ally proceed to cover the story on the assumption that they are acting in a
journalistically reasonable and defensible manner. With respect to the cov-
erage of legal proceedings in particular, public interest in the information
combined with competitive pressures in the news business should often dic-
tate that the press will report the stories to the best of its ability regardless of
the prevailing standard of fault in the event of defamation litigation.
The Court probably will not reconsider its rejection of the judicial pro-
ceedings privilege in Firestone. Despite the theoretical appeal of Justice
Brennan's argument, it is far from clear that the press needs such a privilege.
To the extent that the competing interests warrant a better accommodation
in this area, however, it might make more sense for the Court to proceed by
fine tuning the existing standards. Given the general public interest in assur-
ing full dissemination of information concerning judicial proceedings, per-
haps the Court should construe the concept of public controversy more
broadly and demand less in terms of voluntary action by the plaintiff to
achieve public figure status, at least where the plaintiff is indeed involved in
litigation of legitimate public concern.
The Court is surely correct that a person should not have to sacrifice sig-
nificant protection of reputation when circumstances have involuntarily
dragged him into or he has even initiated a legal proceeding to protect his
own private rights. It need not necessarily follow, however, that an attorney
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422 (1975);
Franklin, What Does Negligence Mean in Defamation Cases? 6 CoM.ENT. 259 (1984); Kalven,
The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 SuP. CT. REV.
267 (1967).
194. See Bloom, supra note 11, 389-93.
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or a litigant in a controversial case of public importance should be entitled to
the protection of the lowest standard of fault, even if he did not voluntarily
attempt to influence a public controversy through the media rather than the
courtroom. Likewise, when a person has engaged in conduct that has re-
sulted in the filing if not the litigation of criminal charges against him, it is
not necessarily unfair to require him to satisfy a higher standard of fault
even if he did not voluntarily thrust himself into the controversy in issue.
The overwhelming majority of legal proceedings would still involve private
disputes between private figures. At the same time, in order to fairly accom-
modate the plaintiff's interest in protection of reputation, the Court should
consider loosening up the actual malice standard either by de-emphasizing
its subjective focus 19 5 or by applying the clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard with somewhat reduced rigor so that the injured plaintiff will have at
least a fighting chance of prevailing. 19 6 As with reconsideration of a judicial
proceedings privilege, the Court would probably not be inclined to move in
this direction. Both common law and constitutional treatment of other is-
sues presented in these cases, such as the extent to which the press should be
held liable for inaccurate descriptions of legal proceedings and the correct
use of legal terminology, may significantly temper the apparent tension be-
tween the need of the press to inform the public fully about legal affairs and
proceedings and the strict application of the public figure doctrine and hence
the lower standard of fault in this area.
II. ACCURACY IN THE DESCRIPTION OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AND
PARTICIPANTS AND THE USE OF LEGAL TERMINOLOGY
A theme that permeates so many of these cases is the extent of the media's
obligation to report the details of legal affairs, proceedings, and participants
accurately and to use legal terminology accurately. This theme arises in the
context of many different legal issues, including whether a statement is de-
famatory, whether it is true, whether it is substantially fair and accurate
under the fair report privilege, whether it is fact or opinion, and whether it
was published with the requisite degree of fault. Often the resolution of any
one of these issues will determine the outcome of the litigation. Despite the
variety of different doctrines under which courts analyze this problem,
courts treat this problem similarly from one context to the next. In many of
these settings the courts usually give the press a large amount of leeway in
describing legal affairs and in using legal terminology. Given the importance
195. See Kalur, Explorations of the "Outer Limits": The Misdirected Evolution of Reckless
Disregard, 61 DEN. L.J. 43 (1983). I have previously defended the actual malice test but only
if courts apply the test fairly, permitting the plaintiff to prove the defendant's state of mind
through objective circumstantial evidence. See Bloom, supra note 11, at 330-35.
196. In Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of the United States Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the
Court reaffirmed its faith in the stringent application of the clear and convincing evidence test
by appellate courts and in the actual malice standard itself as it has evolved. Even more re-
cently in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 105 L. Ed. 2d
562 (1989), the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court finding of actual malice but professed its




of publishing truthful information, the potential for significant harm to repu-
tation, and the frequent ease of achieving accuracy, a point nontheless arises
under each of these doctrines when the press will be held responsible for
defamatory misdescription of legal proceedings or misuse or legal terminol-
ogy. A review of some of the significant decisions in each of these areas
illustrates the basic approaches that the courts have taken.
A. Is It Defamatory?
Frequently, a key issue is whether the description of a participant in a
legal proceeding or the use of a legal term with reference to such a person is
defamatory. This issue generally requires the courts to confront both the
common meaning and connotations of the language employed as well as the
nature of the reputation of the person involved. Attorneys seem to sue the
press for defamation with some frequency, and as a result the courts must
often decide whether a particular statement or allegation would lower the
reputation of the particular attorney or attorneys in general in the public
eye. It is clear that allegations that would undermine an attorney's reputa-
tion for professional honesty 197 or competence 98 or a judge's reputation for
fairness199 are defamatory.
Sometimes, however, whether a statement is defamatory will require the
court to examine closely the role and obligations of the plaintiff as an attor-
197. See. Carey v. Hume, 390 F. Supp. 1026, 1029 (D.D.C. 1975) (statement to the effect
that attorney moved clients files and claimed that someone had stolen them is defamatory);
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 884-85 (Ky. 1981) (state-
ments that criminal attorney would fix the case or bribe the judge are defamatory per se);
Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355 (La. 1981) (statement that attorney was suborning perjury
was defamatory); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 449 N.E.2d 716, 462 N.Y.S.2d 822, 449,
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); November v. Time, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 175, 194 N.E.2d 126,
244 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1963) (statements that attorney advised his client to ignore a subpoena and
that implied that the attorney was trying to take advantage of his client could be defamatory);
Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., 109 Wash.2d 514, 746 P.2d 295 (1987) (charge that prose-
cuting attorney bargained away cases in exchange for campaign contributions is defamatory);
D'Amato v. Freeman Printing Co., 38 Wis. 2d 126, 157 N.W.2d 686 (1968) (statement that
district attorney ignored vice operations is defamatory).
198. Miami Herald v. Frank, 442 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (statements
indicating that attorney was incompetent in preventing client from reorganizing company is
defamatory); McHale v. Lake Charles American Press, 309 So. 2d 556, 561 (La. Ct. App.
1980) (statement that " '[n]o bond buyer would buy a nickel's worth of securities on [the plain-
tiff's] opinion' " was defamatory in that it "portrayed him as a totally incompetent bond attor-
ney"), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 951 (1981); Cohn v. Am-Law, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2367, 2368
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (statement that attorney was totally unprepared for client's sentencing
hearing is defamatory); cf. McBride v. Merrell Dow, 717 F.2d 1460, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(statement that plaintiff was paid much more to testify than other expert witnesses could be
defamatory in that it might imply that his testimony was for sale).
199. Dostert v. Washington Post, 531 F. Supp. 165 (N.D.W.Va. 1982) (statement that
judge "barged into" someone's house can be read to imply he behaved unethically or crimi-
nally); Berkos v. NBC, 161 I11. App. 3d 475, 515 N.E.2d 668 (1987) (implication that judge
accepted bribe to dispose of criminal case favorably is defamatory); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart
& Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (charges that the judge is
probably corrupt and sentences were suspiciously lenient is defamatory), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
969 (1977); Braig v. Field Communications, 500 Pa. Super. 430, 456 A.2d 1366 (1983) (charge
that judge would "blow out" case against police suggests he is biased and is defamatory), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984).
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ney as well as the connotations of the language in issue in order to determine
whether the statement is defamatory. An excellent case in point is Rudin v.
Dow Jones & Co.200 There, a financial magazine, Barron's, published an arti-
cle commenting on the fact that a group of investors, including Frank Sina-
tra and his attorney Milton Rudin, had purchased a large block of stock in a
dredging company and questioning why Sinatra would invest in such a busi-
ness rather than a gambling casino.20 1 Two weeks later, Barron's published
a letter submitted by Rudin under the caption "Sinatra's Mouthpiece.
20 2
Rudin objected to the tone and implications of the initial article.20 3 Rudin
then informed Barron's that he considered the caption "Sinatra's Mouth-
piece" to be defamatory and demanded a retraction.2° 4 The magazine pub-
lished a reply stating that it "meant to cast no aspersion on Mr. Rudin; [o]ur
dictionary defines 'mouthpiece' as 'spokesman'. '20 5 Rudin filed suit and
Barron's moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the statement
was not defamatory. 20 6 The federal district court engaged in an extended
analysis of the term mouthpiece as applied to an attorney. 20 7 While it recog-
nized that mouthpiece could be understood to refer simply to a spokesman,
as Barron's asserted, dictionaries and thesaurae also defined the term as "(an
unscrupulous criminal lawyer or a lawyer in sympathy with the under-
world)" and "puppet,. . . tool,. . . [or] henchman. '20 The court then noted
in reliance on caselaw and ABA Standards that the later connotation is de-
famatory in that it suggests a lack of independent judgement on the part of
an attorney as well as a willingness to sacrifice one client's interest for an-
other.20 9 The court also pointed out that the connection of the term mouth-
piece with Sinatra who was "popularly rumored to be associated with
organized crime" emphasized the possible defamatory connotation. 2 10 Be-
cause the meaning could be defamatory as well as nondefamatory, the court
denied the motion to dismiss.
2 11
Two years later following a full trial2 12 the same judge dismissed the com-
200. 510 F. Supp. 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
201. Id. at 211-12.




206. Id. at 213.
207. Id. at 214-15.
208. Id. at 213-14. Courts have held that linking an attorney with organized crime is de-
famatory. Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1982); Harkaway v. Boston
Herald Traveler Corp., 418 F.2d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1969); Alioto v. Cowles Communications,
Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363, 1371-72 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
209. 510 F. Supp. at 215-16.
210. Id. at 216.
211. Id. at 217; see also Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, 598 S.W.2d 493, 497
(Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (statement that attorney was responsible for "sleazy slight-of-hand" and
"sleazy dealings" referring to alleged threats, acts of vandalism and an "administrative coup"
is defamatory in that it imputes unethical conduct to lawyer); Handelman v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (statement that attorney "ate up"
$800,000 of estate in will contest could be defamatory in that it could imply that the attorney
charged an exorbitant fee or acted unethically by allowing the estate to be wasted).
212. Rudin v. Dow Jones & Co., 557 F. Supp. 535, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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plaint on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the caption
"Sinatra's mouthpiece" was defamatory as used in the circumstances of the
case. Both parties produced expert testimony in an attempt to establish the
proper connotation of the term. 213 The plaintiff produced a former judge, a
former United States attorney, and a Wall Street lawyer, all of whom testi-
fied that the term mouthpiece as applied to an attorney indicated a lack of
integrity and independence. 2 14 The plaintiff also produced a professor of
psychology who testified as to a study he had done which showed that a
statistically significant number of people surveyed regarded "John Doe's
Mouthpiece" as more negative than "John Doe's Spokesman. '215 Finally,
Rudin testified on his own behalf as to his background and good reputation
and noted that he felt that the caption was "an attempt 'to paint me in the
[motion] pictures that I remembered as a kid with the mouthpiece as a fast
talking guy with a derby who will do anything, he has got a bail bondsman
in his pocket, a couple of judges in his other pocket and will do as his client
pleases.' ",216 Barron's produced its own professor of psychology who criti-
cized the methodology and results of the plaintiff's psychologist and pro-
duced his own study which indicated that people surveyed did regard
mouthpiece as somewhat more negative than spokesman but that the differ-
ence narrowed when the survey used the phrase "Sinatra's Mouthpiece. ' 217
The defendant also produced two prominent journalists who testified that
the use of the caption "Sinatra's Mouthpiece" was consistent with accepted
journalistic practices.2
18
Reviewing all the evidence, the court held that Rudin had failed to estab-
lish that the defendant's readers understood the term in the defamatory
sense. 219 The court did not place much weight on the conflicting testimony
of the psychologists. 220 It observed that plaintiff's attorney witnesses em-
phasized the pejorative connotations of the term mouthpiece when linked
with an attorney but noted that the article did not identify the plaintiff as an
attorney in the letter to the editor to which Barron's attached "Sinatra's
Mouthpiece" as a caption but rather identified the plaintiff only in the initial
article published two months earlier. 22' Considering the remainder of the
213. Id. at 538.
214. Among other things, Judge Kauffman, a former justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court testified that " 'mouthpiece,' when used with respect to an attorney, 'clearly communi-
cates one who is more concerned with fulfilling the directions and instructions of a client,
usually a criminal client, and even more specifically an underworld client, and has little or no
concern with the code of professional responsibility, the rules of court and the applicable
law.' " Id. Peter Fleming, the Wall Street lawyer, testified that "the term [mouthpiece] im-
plies an absence of independence which is 'offensive to my concept of a lawyer's function' ".
Id. Paul Curran, the former United States attorney, testified that "an attorney who is a
mouthpiece is 'someone who is more of a tool for his client ... than he should be... .It is most
commonly used in the context of organized crime situations." Id.
215. Id. at 538-39.
216. Id. at 541.
217. Id. at 542.
218. Id. at 542-43.
219. Id. at 543.
220. Id. at 543-44.
221. Id. at 544-45.
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evidence including dictionary definitions and newspaper clippings using the
term "mouthpiece," the court concluded that it is often understood in an
irreverent though not necessarily a defamatory manner when applied to an
attorney. 222 Given that Barron's was not aimed at a legal audience, the
court could not conclude that it was understood in the defamatory sense.
223
Rudin is worth reviewing at this length because it is probably the most
careful and detailed examination that a court has given to defamatory con-
tent in the legal context. It involves the meaning of common slang rather
than strict legal terminology. Nevertheless, it requires the court to come to
grips with the proper role and obligations of an attorney as well as the nature
of an attorney's reputation in the legal community. As the court may have
realized, the extensive expert testimony by psychologists on the meaning of
the term mouthpiece may have been a bit of overkill. It does illustrate how
complex a seemingly straight forward question of defamatory content can
readily become. On the record before it, which seemed to contain more than
ample evidence of the common defamatory understanding of the term, the
court seemed to bend over backwards in its second opinion to reach the
conclusion that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden. It is not unusual in
these types of cases for the courts to construe potentially defamatory state-
ments against the plaintiffs.
224
Ratner v. Young 225 is another case in which a court found it necessary to
look closely at the proper role and professional obligations of an attorney in
222. Id. at 545. Editors for the defendant testified that they had intended to use the term in
an "irreverent," "witty," and "colorful" sense, rather than in a defamatory sense. Id. at 543
n.6.
223. Id.; see also Quilici v. Second Amendment Found., 769 F.2d 414, 418-19 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1013 (1986) (statement that attorney used too much of his side's
time in oral argument is not defamatory); Brower v. New Republic, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1605, 1610 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (no reason to believe attorney's statement of what certain
individual had said to her would be understood to imply that she had unethically breached
client confidence).
224. See, e.g., Lane v. New York Times, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1623, 1626 (W.D. Tenn.
1982) (statement that attorney travelled to Switzerland to remove funds from controversial
client's bank account is not defamatory in that it does not suggest that attorney did anything
improper); Matchett v. Chicago Bar Ass'n, 125 Il1. App. 3d 1004, 467 N.E.2d 271, 276 (1984)
(statement that Bar Association rated plaintiff "unqualified" to be judge when it had actually
termed him "not recommended" is not defamatory where newspaper also printed that his age
was determinative factor), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985), reh'g denied, 472 U.S. 1022
(1985); Wexler v. Chicago Tribune Co., 69 Ill. App. 3d 610, 387 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1979)
(charges that client's funds dwindled significantly after being turned over to attorney is not
defamatory in that it does not suggest that attorney mismanaged them); cf Mitchell v. St.
Louis Business Journal, 689 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (not libel per se to report
that a court convicted plaintiff of carrying unregistered handgun when no such offense ex-
isted); Fulton v. Mississippi, 498 So. 2d 1215 (Miss. 1986) (not defamatory to state that plain-
tiffs signed quitclaim deed with respect to property that they did not own); Hampton v.
Dispatch Printing Co., 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2093-2094 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (although
court had acquitted plaintiff on murder charge on grounds of self defense, statement that plain-
tiff had committed murder was not defamatory in that it may have been used in nonlegal
innocent sense, presumably meaning that the killing had occurred, but with legal justification);
Windsor v. Tennessean, 654 S.W.2d 680, 685-86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (statement that witness
attorney "refreshed his recollection" on witness stand is not defamatory in that it does not
imply that he committed perjury), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984).
225. 465 F. Supp. 386 (D.V.I. 1979).
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order to determine whether the statements in issue were defamatory. 226
There, a judge accused attorneys William Kunstler and Margaret Ratner in
a letter to the editor of trying to turn a controversial murder trial into a
political trial and of trying to provoke the court into committing prejudicial
error.227 The district court concluded that these allegations were not defam-
atory observing in the process that:
many famous political trials in American and English history have been
considered to reflect credit upon the defense attorney who was advocat-
ing an unpopular cause. John Adams was defense counsel in the so-
called Boston Massacre cases ..... Kunstler himself evidently consid-
ered that there was nothing unprofessional about being associated with
the defense of a political trial .... Whether trial tactics attempting to
provoke the court and to obtain a mistrial would be considered unethi-
cal or unprofessional conduct would depend on the circumstances. All
competent defense lawyers in criminal cases try to get reversible error in
the record. It is generally accepted that there is nothing wrong in such
efforts as long as they are not corrupt. 228
The statements in Ratner were such that a layman might well have consid-
ered them to be defamatory because they likely were inconsistent with the
common understanding of the role of a lawyer. Yet a closer look at the true
professional obligations of an attorney revealed that this was not the case. 229
This is consistent with the tendency of the courts to construe the common
law rules strictly in this area.
Sometimes these cases turn on whether an arguably improper use of a
legal term is defamatory. In Sprecher v. Dow Jones & Co.,230 for instance, a
securities lawyer sued the publisher of the Wall Street Journal on the theory
that an article stating that the SEC and the plaintiff settled an SEC com-
plaint against the plaintiff by a consent decree was defamatory because it
failed to state that the SEC dismissed the complaint with prejudice. 231 The
court disagreed and held that the statement as published was both nonde-
226. Id. at 393-97.
227. Id. at 392.
228. Id. at 395.
229. See Stevens v. Morris Communications, 170 Ga. App. 612, 317 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1984)
(not defamatory to report that plaintiff was attorney for nursing home experiencing legal diffi-
culties); Fisher v. Detroit Free Press, 158 Mich. App. 409, 404 N.W.2d 765, 767 (1987) (news-
paper's repetition of judge's statement that attorney filed action seeking $15,000 for lost
companionship of a tree was not defamatory); Marchiondo v. New Mexico State Tribune Co.,
98 N.M. 282, 648 P.2d 321, 332 (Ct. App. 1982) (not defamatory to say that attorney who
contributed money to governor's campaign is his crony and that attorney might be appointed
to public office); Golub v. Esquire Publishing Co., 124 A.D.2d 528, 508 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1986)
(statement that plaintiff was "loose tongued lawyer" who revealed his "innermost secrets" is
not defamatory since it does not suggest that he divulges client confidences); Sellers v.
Oklahoma Publishing Co., 687 P.2d 116, 121 (Okla. 1987) (statement that attorney accused
judge of manipulating jury to aid former law partner did not defame the attorney in that it did
not imply that he had done anything wrong); Herron v. Tribune Publishing Co., 108 Wash. 2d
162, 736 P.2d 249, 257 (1987) (statement that opposing counsel asked for disqualification of
plaintiff prosecutor does not impute criminal conduct, and hence is not defamatory).
230. 88 A.D.2d 550, 450 N.Y.S.2d 330 (1982), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 862, 447 N.E.2d 75 (1983).
231. 88 A.D.2d at 552, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 332.
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famatory and true.232 It pointed out that "the term 'with prejudice' is a legal
one which has little, if any, meaning to the average reader. ' 233 As a matter
of policy,
[t]o hold that a possible omission of this nature by a reporter may be
deemed defamatory would place upon the press the onerous and unrea-
sonable burden of having to ascertain, whenever a news story is pub-
lished, if something might conceivably have been left out which could
be subject to misconception.
2 34
On the other hand, a court might well consider a statement about an at-
torney nondefamatory simply because the more sophisticated audience of a
legally oriented periodical would understand that it was not to be interpreted
in an overly literal manner. In Owen v. Carr,23 5 for instance, an Illinois
Court of Appeals concluded that the readers of The National Law Journal
would understand that statements to the effect that an attorney was trying to
establish in litigation that another attorney had used the disciplinary process
for purposes of intimidation did not amount to an allegation of fact but
merely an "advocate's view of his client's cause of action. '236 On occasion
however, the press will use legal terminology in a manner that gives rise to a
defamatory implication. In Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc.,237 for in-
stance, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a jury could
properly have found that the statement that the plaintiff was "convicted of
stealing tapes" in reference to a civil fraud verdict was defamatory in that it
implied that a court had found the plaintiff guilty of criminal conduct. 238
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 332; see also Minton v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ga. App. 525, 333
S.E.2d 913, 916 (1985) (statement that police arrested plaintiff while "driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol" would not carry any greater sting than driving under the influence of drugs);
cf Owen v. Carr, 134 11. App. 3d 855, 478 N.E.2d 658, 662 (1985) (statement that attorney
used legal disciplinary process for purposes of "intimidation" did not necessarily imply crimi-
nal conduct but still might be defamatory), aff'd, 113 Il. 2d 273, 497 N.E.2d 1145 (1986);
Nearis v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 310 N.E.2d 923, 924 (1972) (statement that court
committed plaintiff to "Lawrence jail" was not defamatory on theory that it might suggest to
readers that court held plaintiff in criminal, rather than civil, contempt); Robinson v. U.S.
News & World Report, Inc., 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1695, 1696-97 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (not
defamatory to report that plaintiff arrested by F.B.I. rather than state police).
235. 134 Ill. App. 3d 855, 478 N.E.2d 658 (1985).
236. 478 N.E.2d at 663.
237. 738 F.2d 660, 671 (5th Cir. 1984), reh'g denied, 738 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1985).
238. Id. The court also concluded that the statement that "the New Jersey attorney gen-
eral's office was 'wondering whether its reach extends to Texas'" could also be considered
defamatory in that, in context, it suggested that the plaintiff may have fled from a criminal
investigation of his activity. Id.; see also Adams v. Daily Telegraph Printing Co., 292 S.C. 273,
356 S.E.2d 118, 122 (Ct. App. 1986) (statements broadcast by television station in which father
of one of two murdered boys pointed out that plaintiff, the father of the other boy, refused to
cooperate with authorities, was hiding behind the Fifth Amendment and had hired an attorney
was susceptible to defamatory inference that plaintiff was guilty of murder); Jones v. Garner,
250 S.C. 479, 158 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1968) (jury could have found that term "tax evasion" was
used and understood in a defamatory sense to connote criminal concealment rather than legal
avoidance); cf King v. Globe Newspaper Co., 490 Mass. 795, 512 N.E.2d 241, 249 (1987)
(statement that governor called judge and attempted to persuade him to change sentence is
defamatory in that it suggests governor was attempting to interfere improperly with the legal
process), cert.denied, 108 S.Ct. 1121, 98 L.Ed. 2d 389 (1988).
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This seems to be a reasonable construction of the statement, although in
dissent on the related issue of falsity Judge Tate argued that the court was
reading the statement hypercritically with the eye of a law review note editor




Questions involving the proper use of legal terminology often arise in defa-
mation litigation under the issue of truth and falsity. On this issue as well
the courts tend to give the press a fair degree of leeway. The courts will not
permit the plaintiff to establish falsity simply because a reporter has techni-
cally misused a legal term or substituted a more commonly used term for a
more technical one. For instance, in Hovey v. Iowa State Daily240 the Iowa
Supreme Court held that it was not false to report that the criminal defend-
ant had raped the plaintiff even though in fact the criminal defendant forced
her to perform oral sex, which the statute legally classified as "second degree
sexual abuse" rather than rape. 241  The court noted that the terms are
largely interchangeable even as a legal matter and that whatever difference
existed "was not material enough for the inaccuracy to be actionable. '242
239. 738 F.2d at 678, 680.
240. 372 N.W.2d 253 (Iowa 1985).
241. Id. at 256.
242. Id.; see also Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1112 (6th Cir. 1978) (terms "swin-
dle", "phony" and "take" are a substantially accurate description of securities fraud allega-
tions against plaintiff), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); Lambert v. Providence Journal Co.,
508 F.2d 656, 658-59 (lst Cir.) ("murder" carries no greater sting than "killing" or "homi-
cide"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. New York Times Co.,
665 F. Supp. 248, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (description of cease and desist order against plain-
tiff for "failing to deliver merchandise" rather than for "failing to deliver merchandise or re-
funds within a reasonable period of time" is substantially true) (emphasis in original), aff'd, 842
F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1988); Chang v. Michiana Telecasting Corp., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1889,
1900 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (characterizing secret photocopying and misappropriation of trade
secrets as industrial espionage is substantially accurate); Lal v. CBS, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 356,
361 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (statement that defendant's case "is ending in triumph" is substantially
true where in context reporter was clearly referring to petition for preliminary relief), aff'd,
726 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1984); Piracci v. Hearst Corp., 263 F. Supp. 511, 514 (D. Md. 1966)
(description of charge as "possession of marijuana" is substantially accurate), aff'd, 371 F.2d
1016 (4th Cir. 1967); McKeon v. The Gazette, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1507, 1508 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1984) (statement that police arrested plaintiff for sale of controlled substance is
substantially true whether police arrested him for sale or possession with intent to sell); Brake
& Alignment World v. Post-Newsweek, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2457, 2458 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1984) (statement that police charged plaintiff with "bilking" customers is true where police
had charged him with fraud); Griffin v. Kentucky Post, 10 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1159, 1160
(Ky. Cir. Ct. 1983) (statement that court convicted plaintiff of nude dancing where she had
pleaded guilty to violating the occupational licensing ordinance by dancing semi-nude is true);
Drury v. Feeney, 505 So. 2d 111, 113 (La. Ct. App.) (statement that court convicted plaintiff
attorney of mail fraud by cheating insurance companies and clients when in fact he was only
convicted of mail fraud by cheating clients is substantially true), writ denied, 506 So. 2d 1225
(La. 1987); Hamilton v. Lake Charles American Press, Inc., 372 So. 2d 239, 242 (La. Ct. App.)
(statement that court had disbarred plaintiff when judge had temporarily stayed his disbar-
ment is substantially true, and statement that court convicted plaintiff of automobile accident
fraud when in fact court convicted him of mail fraud by faking automobile accidents is sub-
stantially true), writ denied, 375 So. 2d 943 (La. 1979); Hopkins v. Keith, 348 So. 2d 999, 1002
(La. Ct. App. 1977) (statement that plaintiff was "convicted for running a gambling game"
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Nor will the courts construe a word as bearing a legal connotation where
in context it carries a common non-legal meaning. In Anderson v.
Cramlet,24 3 for instance, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit declined
to hold that a statement that plaintiff "kidnapped" his son meant that he had
committed the legal crime of kidnapping given that the word is commonly
understood to refer to a parent taking or concealing a child from the other
parent which was what the plaintiff had done.244 Likewise the courts will
generally not read implications into legal terminology that are not readily
apparent to the average reader. In Sivulich v. Howard Publications, Inc. 2
45
an Illinois Court of Appeals refused to conclude that the statement that
"'[c]harges of aggravated battery have been filed'" against the plaintiff was
false in that it necessarily implied that the police had filed criminal
charges. 246 Rather, both in common parlance and from a more technical
standpoint the statement could encompass civil as well as criminal
charges.247
Generally, whether a court will consider a statement false when the press
has misused a legal term or mischaracterized a legal matter will depend on
whether the sting of the inaccuracy is significantly greater than that of the
truth. In Fendler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 248 an editorial stated that the
plaintiff "is doing four-to-five years in prison because of his fraudulent prac-
tices at Lincoln Thrift. '249 Plaintiff had in fact received a four-to-five year
sentence but was out on bond pending appeal.2 50 The Arizona Court of
Appeals concluded that the report was substantially true. 251 It acknowl-
edged that it obviously made a difference to the plaintiff that he was not yet
in prison, but as far as the harm to his reputation was concerned, the sting
was derived from the fact of conviction and sentence and not from the fact of
actual physical confinement.
2 52
when in fact he forfeited a substantial bond on the charge is substantially true); Rosen v.
Capital City Press, 314 So. 2d 511, 515 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (statement that police charged
plaintiff with illegal distribution of narcotics when police actually charged him with distribu-
tion of amphetamines which the law classifies as narcotics is substantially true); Schaefer v.
Hearst Corp., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1734, 1736 (Md. Super. Ct. 1979) (statement that grand
jury indicted plaintiff when in fact police had charged him by summons and court had con-
victed him is substantially correct); Guss v. Times Herald, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1703,
1704 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1987) (statement that police charged plaintiff with embezzlement of
$140,000 is substantially accurate even though police actually charged him with embezzling
$39,000 since it would still remain a felony); DeFalco v. Anderson, 209 N.J. Super. 99, 506
A.2d 1280, 1283 (1986) (describing plaintiff's convictions for taking money illegally from
aliens as "extortion" or "shakedown" is not inaccurate); Windsor v. Tennessean, 654 S.W.2d
680, 687 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (statement that plaintiff was "subverting a court order" is a
substantially accurate way of saying he was "block[ing] a motion to return the property")
(emphasis in original), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984).
243. 789 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1986).
244. Id. at 844-45.
245. 466 N.E.2d at 1220.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. 130 Ariz. 475, 636 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1981).
249. 636 P.2d at 1259.
250. Id. at 1260.
251. Id. at 1262.
252. Id. The court also concluded that a statement that the plaintiff was "convicted of
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At some point a misdescription of a legal proceeding will carry a greater
sting than the literal truth. In Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc. a newspa-
per reported that a court had convicted the plaintiffs, two former sheriff's
deputies, of malfeasance for having been found guilty of granting a jail in-
mate a weekend pass in exchange for stolen goods.2 53 The court had in fact
convicted the deputies of the misdemeanor of malfeasance as a result of re-
leasing the prisoner, but the court had dismissed the felony charge of public
bribery relating to the receipt of the stolen goods.25 4 The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the sting of the story as reported using
the inaccurate phrase " 'in exchange for stolen goods' " was significantly
greater than the strict truth.2 55 "The difference between malfeasance in of-
fice and receiving stolen goods is more than the difference between a misde-
meanor and a felony. . . . The Daily World stories could be viewed as
converting a foolish and irresponsible betrayal of the public trust into a rapa-
cious and calculated one."' 2 5 6 Likewise, in Martin-Trigona v. Kupcinet a fed-
eral district court held that a report that a court had convicted the plaintiff
of forgery and embezzlement was false where on appeal the court had re-
versed the convictions and as a legal matter expunged the convictions from
the record. 257 Consequently, the plaintiff simply was not convicted as of the
time that the article was written.
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone the United States Supreme Court reviewed the
state court record to ensure that the defamatory statements in issue were in
fraud" was a substantially true characterization of his conviction for making a false-bookkeep-
ing entry and failing to file a tax return. Id. at 1263. Weisburgh v. Mahady, 147 Vt. 70, 511
A.2d 304, 306 (1986) (report that police arrested plaintiff for removing $5,000 in stolen prop-
erty when it was actually only $500 was substantially true); see also Jones v. Himstead, 7
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2433 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1981) (statements that plaintiff was a tax delin-
quent in three towns rather than two, and that a person sued him for $150,000 rather than
$125,000 were substantially true.).
253. 814 F.2d 1066, 1068 (5th Cir. 1987).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 1073. The court indicated that it would consider the charge substantially accu-
rate if the lay reader would regard the difference as a mere technicality. Id.
256. Id.; see also Levine v. CMP Publications, 738 F.2d 660, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1984) (state-
ment that lawsuits accused plaintiff of theft where cases involved possible misappropriation of
trade secrets presented jury question on falsity), reh'q denied, 753 F.2d 1341 (1985) (en banc);
Chang v. Michiana Telecasting, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1889, 1899 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (pro-
viding a dollar value for alleged misappropriation where none listed in legal complaint is more
than minor inaccuracy); Kohn v. West Hawaii Today, 65 Haw. 584, 656 P.2d 79, 84 (1982)
(report that police seized " 'heroin, cocaine, hashish, and morphine' " from plaintiff's business
carries a far greater sting than police's actual seizure of six grams of marijuana); Jones v.
Himstead, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2433, 2441 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1981) (statement that plaintiff
built without zoning variance when in fact law changed creating ambiguity after plaintiff had
built presents question of fact on substantial truth); Dibble v. WROC TV Channel 8, 142
A.D.2d 966, 530 N.Y.S.2d 388, 389 (1988) (defense of truth is not available where defendant
published statement that grand jury " 'indicted [plaintiff] on charges of fraud, embezzlement
and securities violations' " when grand jury had only indicted plaintiff on the first charge);
Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 295 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Ct. App. 1980) (false to state that
police charged person with crime where police officer had merely stated he would be charged).
257. 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2369, 2372-73 (N.D. Ill. 1988). The court relied on legal
definitions of the term conviction in reaching its decision. Id. at 2373. Cf. Torres v. Playboy
Enter., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1182, 1185 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (fair report did not protect crimi-
nal conviction when it had been reversed four months before article was published).
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fact false on the theory that if they were not false then there could be no
proof of fault.25 8 The Court concluded that the Florida courts properly
found that the published statement-that a court had granted the plaintiff's
former husband a divorce on the grounds of both extreme cruelty and adul-
tery- was false, because the Florida Supreme Court ultimately held that the
judgment was based solely on the former ground.259 The issue was not
whether the published statement carried a greater sting, which it almost cer-
tainly did, but rather whether it was an accurate summarization of an un-
clear trial court opinion.260 Although the divorce court judge mentioned the
evidence of adultery by both parties in the record, it failed to make a formal
finding of either adultery or extreme cruelty in its decree. 261 The Supreme
Court was unwilling to allow the press much leeway on the issue of truth, at
least where the defamatory potential as well as the possibility of error should
have been quite plain. 262 As a practical matter, the Court seemed to say that
if the press relies on a defense of truth, it must get it right at least with
respect to sting even if the truth was not immediately apparent at the time.
While this may seem harsh, it is not inconsistent with the common law cases
which seem to focus on the accuracy of the gist or sting in determining
whether a published statement was true or false. Nor is it necessarily unfair
to the publisher as long as the law provides a sufficient degree of breathing
space through the issue of fault. Analytically it may make sense for courts
to be somewhat unforgiving on the question of falsity but then provide the
reporter with a fair margin of error when considering whether the statement
was published with negligence or reckless disregard for the truth. That
seemed to be the approach that Justice Powell emphasized in his concur-
rence in Firestone.
263
C. Fair Report and Accuracy
A similar issue often arises under the privilege of fair report which pro-
tects the defendant only to the extent that the report of judicial or official
proceeding is "fair" and "accurate. ' ' 2 64 As with the issue of truth, the courts
258. 424 U.S. 448, 458 (1976).
259. Id. at 458-59.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. The Court cautioned:
Petitioner may well argue that the meaning of the trial court's decree was un-
clear, but this does not license it to choose from among several conceivable in-
terpretations the one most damaging to respondent. Having chosen to follow
this tack, petitioner must be able to establish not merely that the item reported
was a conceivable or plausible interpretation of the decree, but that the item was
factually correct.
Id. at 459.
263. Id. at 464-70 (Powell, J. concurring); see infra notes 308-323 and accompanying text.
In Firestone, 305 So.2d 172, 177-78 (1974), the Florida Supreme Court accorded the press far
less leeway on the fault issue than Justice Powell. Writing for the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Rehnquist seemed to be leaning toward the Florida court's approach. However,
Justice Powell and Justice Stewart who joined in Powell's special concurrence were both essen-
tial to Justice Rehnquist's majority. Id. at 464.
264. The privilege of fair report is usually statutorily based. Fair report can consist of
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will excuse defendant's inaccurate use of legal terminology as long as the
error does not increase the sting of the allegation. 265 In Karp v. Hill &
Knowlton, for instance, a federal district court held that it was sufficiently
accurate under the New York fair report privilege to state that the plaintiff
had defrauded a former employer when a state court had granted a prelimi-
nary injunction against plaintiff based on the employer's claims of breach of
fiduciary duty, unfair competition, and misappropriation. 266 In applying the
New York fair report privilege, the court observed that the New York deci-
sions "evidence a judicial willingness to immunize and even encourage flexi-
separate privileges covering either judicial or official proceedings and official records. Schia-
vone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1087, 1087-88 n.28 (3d Cir. 1988). In many
jurisdictions a significant body of caselaw defines the scope of the privilege in terms of the type
of proceedings and records that are covered. See, e.q., Law Firm of Daniel P. Foster v. Turner
Broadcasting Sys., 844 F.2d 955, 961 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that New York courts would
extend fair report privilege to execution of search warrant issued by federal judge), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 559, 102 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1988); Lavin v. New York News, 757 F.2d 1416, 1419
(3d Cir. 1985) (New Jersey fair report privilege covers statements made in affidavit submitted
to obtain search warrant), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1139 (1986); Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692
F.2d 266, 271-72 (2d Cir. 1982) (reporter cannot rely on Pennsylvania official records privilege
where he did not rely on official records in question in writing story), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1171 (1983); Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 140 (3d Cir.) (Pennsylvania fair report privi-
lege would cover summary of F.B.I. report on organized crime), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836
(1981); Stone v. Banner Publishing Corp., 677 F. Supp. 242, 246 (D. Vt. 1988) (concluding
Vermont privilege does not cover investigation prior to judicial proceedings); Roehsler v.
American Broadcasting Co., 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2444, 2448-49 (D.N.J. 1985). (New
Jersey fair report privilege does not cover investigative report on topic incidentally before
court); Eastern Milk Producers v. Milkweed, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2100 (N.D.N.Y. 1982)
(New York official proceedings privilege covers administrative investigation); Mathis v. Phila-
delphia Newspapers, 455 F. Supp. 406, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania common law infor-
mal official proceedings privilege covered photograph obtained from F.B.I.); Phillips v.
Evening Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78, 89 (D.C. 1980) (official records privilege does not
cover log of police hotline), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 989 (1981); Jones v. Taibbi, 400 Mass. 786,
512 N.E.2d 260, 266-67 (1987) (Massachusetts fair report privilege would cover statements by
police only if made public as part of official statements); Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle
Creek, 427 Mich. 157, 398 N.W.2d 245, 252 (1986) (Michigan official records privilege does
not extend to records of arrest). See also Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 233, 531
P.2d 76, 83 (1975) (applying the standard of negligence to override the qualified privilege of
fair report); Sowle, Defamation and the First Amendment: The Case for a Constitutional Privi-
lege of Fair Report, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 469 (1979).
265. See, e.g., Zerman v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 677 F. Supp. 1316, 1322-23 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (stating that plaintiff attorney had brought "'several unsuccessful appeals'" when he
had only brought one along with petition for rehearing and two petitions for certiorari is not
sufficiently inaccurate under New York privilege); Ricci v. Venture Magazine, 574 F. Supp.
1563 (D. Mass. 1983) (full report of incident during trial would carry no less sting than the
abridged report made by defendant); Eastern Milk Producers v. Milkweed, 8 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2100, 2103 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (statement that loan guarantee was "illegal" is a suffi-
ciently accurate characterization of fact that it violated federal regulation); Jones v. Taibbi, 400
Mass. 786, 512 N.E.2d 260, 266 (1987) (stating that police charged plaintiff with murder when
police only booked him on suspicion of murder is substantially accurate); Salcedo v. El Diario
Publishing Co., 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2308, 2311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (failure to qualify
each charge with the word "alleged" is not inacurrate when clear reporter was summarizing
charges in indictment); Lekutanaj v. News Group Publications, 12 Med. L. Rep. (BNA) 1782,
1783 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (statement that plaintiff was defendant in civil lawsuit when he had
simply guaranteed the settlement is substantially accurate under New York fair report
privilege).
266. 631 F. Supp. 360, 363-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); cf Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 730, 734
(4th Cir. 1980) (court could not find reckless disregard for truth where writer summarized
reports of corporate executive's illegal kickback scheme as extortion).
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ble characterization of fraud-like conduct ..... Thus, even when the term
fraud is not part of the judicial record, the courts will permit its use if it
fairly characterizes some aspect of a judicial proceeding. '2 67 Likewise in
Handelsman v. San Francisco Chronicle a California appellate court held
that the use of the criminal term theft to describe a civil action for conver-
sion was not sufficiently inaccurate as a matter of law to fall outside of the
California fair report privilege.
268
In Jones v. Garner, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
a statement that the plaintiff had engaged in tax evasion was sufficiently in-
accurate to fall outside of the fair report privilege if the jury construed it to
imply that the police had charged the defendant with criminal conduct since
the tax liens on which the reporter relied did not carry such a connota-
tion.2 6 9 In other words, where the defendant chose an ambiguous legal term
with a potentially defamatory meaning to paraphrase a non-ambiguous legal
document, he ran the risk that reader and the jury would infer the worst.
Just as the statement must be accurate in order to be privileged, it must
also be fair. The courts recognize that the press will inevitably need to
abridge the events that transpired in the courtroom in order to report
them.270 In describing the severance of plaintiff's trial because the jury may
have seen him make a threatening gesture to a government witness, a federal
district court in Ricci v. Venture Magazine held that the defendant's descrip-
tion was fair even though it omitted the fact that plaintiff's attorney had
disputed that the incident had occurred. 27 1 On the other hand, a court
267. 631 F. Supp. at 364; see also Jennings v. Telegram-Tribune, 164 Cal. App. 3d 119,
128, 210 Cal. Rptr. 485, 490 1985) (report that plaintiff was guilty of " 'tax evasion' " and
" 'tax fraud' "is accurate description of his no contest plea to charge of failing to file tax return
where he had over $400,000 of income); Suriano v. New York News, 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1309, 1310 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) (report is not inaccurate where reporter wrote that court held
doctor liable in malpractice case although jury had found him only seventy percent responsi-
ble). But see Gurda v. Orange County Publications, 81 A.D.2d 120, 439 N.Y.S.2d 417, 419-20
(1981) (jury could decide the term "defrauded" implied court found plaintiff guilty of a crimi-
nal rather than a civil offense, and therefore is inaccurate report of public proceeding).
268. 11 Cal. App. 3d 381, 388, 90 Cal. Rptr. 188, 191 (1970). The reporter testified that he
knew the difference, but did not believe that the average reader would. Id. at 386, 90 Cal.
Rptr. at 190.
269. 158 S.E.2d 909, 911, 913 (S.C. 1968); see also Martin-Trigona v. Kupcinet, 15 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 2369, 2374 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (report that plaintiff convicted of two felonies when
in fact the appellate court reversed convictions was neither fair nor accurate); Britt v. Knight
Publishing Co., 291 F. Supp. 781, 784 (D.S.C. 1968) (reporting police charged plaintiff with
offense involving intent to defraud when police only charged him with a crime that did not
involve moral turpitude is not substantially correct); cf Crittendon v. Combined Communica-
tions, 714 P.2d 1026, 1029-30 (Okla. 1985) (description of pathology report in malpractice suit
as stating plaintiff was "healthy" instead of "normal" is substantially accurate); Gurda v. Or-
ange County Publications, 81 A.D.2d 120, 439 N.Y.S.2d 417, 420 (1981) (statement that court
fined plaintiff for fraud when court assessed him attorneys fees in civil fraud case presented a
jury question as to whether report was fair or inaccurately implied that court had convicted
plaintiff of a crime).
270. For instance, a federal district court in Ricci v. Venture Magazine, 574 F. Supp. 1563
(D. Mass. 1983) noted that "[j]udicial proceedings often consist of long periods of unexciting
evidence and colloquy, punctuated by occasional exchanges among participants in which
depths of human emotion are exposed. Media reports may permissibly focus on the more
dramatic occurrences, to the exclusion of the less interesting." Id. at 1567.
271. Id. at 1568. The court observed that "[the public] understand[s] that participants in a
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would not consider fair a report that creates or increases the sting of the
defamatory statement through omission. In the significant case of
Schiavonne Construction Co. v. Time, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that as a matter of law a report was unfair and therefore
outside of the protection of the fair report privilege where the defendant
reported that an F.B.I. report on the disappearence of Jimmy Hoffa men-
tioned the plaintiff's name but deliberately omitted mentioning that none of
the references " 'suggested any criminality or organized crime
associations.' ",272
Both on the question of falsity as well as accuracy and fairness under the
fair report privilege, common sense rather than legal technicality tends
largely to guide the decisions the courts reach concerning misleading use of
legal terminology. The courts clearly understand that inaccurate descrip-
tions of legal matters can sometimes carry great potential for harm. They
tend to proceed on the quite proper assumption that unless the descriptions
are aimed specifically at a professional audience, courts must evaluate them
from the perspective of the uninitiated layman rather than parse them like a
legal document.273
D. Fact or Opinion
Both as a matter of common law274 and constitutional law,275 the law of
defamation protects statements of opinion. In other words, liability can be
imposed only with respect to a false and defamatory statement of fact. In
drawing the line between protected statements of opinion and unprotected
statements of fact where the defamatory allegations involve descriptions of
legal matters or legal terminology, the courts have again tended to give the
press a fair margin of protection. Although the case of Karp v. Hill &
Knowlton 276 involved a statement by a corporation's public relations firm to
trial often make sharply conflicting contentions, and that witnesses often give conflicting testi-
mony. Media reports are not required to remind readers of such well understood matters as
these." Id.
272. 847 F.2d 1069, 1085-88 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Street v. National Broadcasting Co.,
645 F.2d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (fair report privilege does not cover portrayal of
famous Scottsboro trial in docudrama due to lack of neutrality where show omitted plaintiff's
version and emphasized derogatory interpretation of events), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095
(1981).
273. See Ricci v. Venture Magazine, 574 F. Supp. at 1567 ("cases indicate that courts
hearing defamation claims are to apply a common sense standard of expected lay interpreta-
tion of media reports of trials, rather than inquiring whether a report was strictly correct in
defining legal charges and describing legal rulings").
274. See generally R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 153-187 (2d ed.
1980); Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205
(1976); Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221 (1976). The fact-
opinion distinction at common law was quite complex. Id. For a critical analysis of the defi-
ciencies of the fact-opinion distinction, see Franklin & Bussel, The Plaintiff's Burden in Defa-
mation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 825, 861-87 (1984).
275. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). Authorities still dis-
pute the proper mode of analysis for distinguishing fact from opinion under the First Amend-
ment. Perhaps the leading case is Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
276. 631 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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a trade journal as opposed to a statement by the press itself, it provides a
nice illustration of a common judicial approach in the area. In that case the
plaintiff in the defamation action, Karp, had been sued by Buckingham on a
variety of unfair trade claims and had been subjected to an injunction by a
federal district court.27 7 The appellate court set aside the injunction due to
an insufficient showing of irreparable harm, indicating that it was unlikely
that Karp would ultimately prevail on most of its claims.2 78 When the court
announced the decision, Hill & Knowlton, the public relations firm for the
plaintiff in the trade secret case, issued a press release stating that "[t]he
ruling supports our claim that Mr. Karp defrauded Buckingham....
Karp sued Hill & Knowlton for defamation. 28 0 The court concluded that
"[als one interpretation of a relatively complex and lengthy judicial opinion,
the statement could never be proven right or wrong, much less 'true' or
'false'. . . . and because the context in which it was presented earmarked it as
such, it was non-actionable opinion. '28 1 Likewise in Jenkins v. KYW the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a reporter's
statement suggesting that a criminal judge had failed to abide by his oath by
imposing too lenient of a sentence on a convicted murderer was simply a
277. Id. at 361-62.
278. Id. at 361.
279. Id. at 362.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 365. See, e.g., Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2169,
2177 (8th Cir. 1989) (statement that F.B.I. agent "knowingly prepared" witness to give false
testimony was protected opinion); Janklow v. Newsweek, 788 F.2d 1300, 1303-05 (8th Cir.)
(en banc) (implication that plaintiff attorney general persecuted Indian activist because the
latter had accused him of raping a teenage girl is statement of opinion), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
883 (1986); Lewis v. Time, Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 552-56 (9th Cir. 1983) (statement that attorney
who had been successfully sued for malpractice and fraud was "shady practitioner" and should
be disbarred is statement of opinion based on true factual statement); Information Control v.
Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980) (press release by defendant in
lawsuit that plaintiff was using lawsuit to avoid payment of its obligations is protected opin-
ion); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2050, 2051-52 (Ariz. Super.
Ct. 1988) (statement quoting federal officials as saying that state drug bust was "illegal and
publicity stunt" is statement of opinion); Reddick v. Craig, 719 P.2d 340, 346-47 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985) (statement in letters to editor referring to county budget as "swindles" and "excess
. . . 'take'" are statements of opinion); Slavik v. News Journal, 428 A.2d 15, 16 (Del. 1981)
(statement that public official had " 'abused' his office" is matter of opinion where appellate
court had reversed his felony conviction for perjury but where he had pleaded guilty to ob-
struction of justice); Hoag v. Charlotte Republican-Tribune, 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1535,
1540 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1979) (statement that court convicted defendant on basis of plaintiff's
testimony which turned out to be false is statement of opinion); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rhinehart &
Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d (statement that judge is unfit
for office and ought to be removed is a statement of opinion); cf. Scott v. News Herald, 25 Ohio
St. 3d 243, 496 N.E.2d 699, 706-08 (1986) (statement by sportswriter that high school wres-
tling coach "beat the law with the 'big lie' " arguably implying that he committed perjury at
administrative hearing is statement of opinion), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977); Marks v.
New York News, 4 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2280 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (editorial stating that
judge is incompetent and calling for his removal is statement of opinion); Haas v. Painter, 62
Or. App. 719, 662 P.2d 768, 771 (1983) (statement implying that prosecutor responsible for
police failure to give Miranda warnings to juvenile murder suspect by discouraging contact
between police and prosecutor before investigation is complete is statement of opinion); Camer
v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wash. App. 2d 29, 723 P.2d 1195, 1202 (1986) (quotes from
lawyers that plaintiff's statements were " 'frivolous' and constitute a 'nuisance' " are state-
ments of opinion), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987).
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statement of the reporter's opinion.282
A party, however, is not at liberty to say anything it chooses about a legal
matter and then characterize it as a non-actionable opinion. In Tomson v.
Stephan, for instance, a federal district court held that the defendant and
party to a confidential settlement of a sexual harassment case made state-
ments of fact when he asserted that the charges had been " 'without merit'
and 'totally unfounded'. ' 28 3 As the court noted, the statements by a party
with first hand knowledge of the underlying incident and the resulting settle-
ment was equivalent to an assertion that the incident had not in fact oc-
curred as opposed to an objective third party's assessment of the case.
284
The courts recognize that reporters and writers, especially when they are
editorializing, often use strong language to describe participants and events
in legal proceedings. Often the clear intent as well as the meaning conveyed
to the ordinary reader is one of strong censure rather than an attempt to
make a factual assertion, even though they employ legal terminology or a
description of a legal proceeding. Given the general public nature of legal
proceedings, such commentary can be socially significant and should not be
unduly discouraged. Consequently, the courts tend appropriately to provide
a fair margin of protection by policing the fact opinion distinction with an
inclination toward finding opinion.
E. Proof of Fault
In defamation litigation courts most often consider press misuse of legal
terminology under the issue of proof of fault. As noted above, constitutional
law requires a public figure or public official plaintiff to prove that the de-
fendant published the defamatory statements with actual malice, defined as
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.285 A private figure
plaintiff must at least establish that the defendant was negligent in publish-
ing the defamatory falsehoods. 286
Generally, a plaintiff has difficulty establishing that a reporter or editor
knew that a description of a legal proceeding was false, or that the use of a
282. 829 F.2d 403, 408-09 (3d Cir. 1987).
283. 699 F. Supp. 860, 866 (D.C. Kan. 1988).
284. Id.; see also Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 1980)
(statement that plaintiff, a mayor, raped a woman at gunpoint ten years earlier and paid her off
to obstruct justice is statement of fact not opinion); Ragano v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1005,
1009-10 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (publishing picture of attorney with his organized crime figure cli-
ents and labeling those pictured as "hoodlums" is statement of fact and not opinion), aff'd,
427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970); Silsdorf v. Levine, 59 N.Y.2d 8, 449 N.E.2d 716, 719-21, 462
N.Y.S.2d 822, 826-27 (statement that " 'it pays to do business with the Mayor' " following
recitation of allegations against him could be construed as statement of fact indicating he had
used his public office illegally), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, Inc., 397 N.Y.S.2d 943, 951 42 N.Y.2d 369, 381-82, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 1304, (state-
ment that judge was " 'probably corrupt' and that his sentences of certain defendants were
suspiciously lenient, with strong undertones of conspiracy and illegality" are statements of
fact), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
285. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of proof of fault in
media defamation litigation beyond the context of legal affairs coverage, see Bloom, supra note
11.
286. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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legal term of art was inaccurate, or even that he proceeded in disregard of
strong reasons to believe that this was so. The courts well understand that
the law is complex and its language is often confusing to the non-legally
trained reporter. Consequently the misuse of a legal term or a misstatement
regarding the effect of a legal proceeding scarcely shows that the reporter
must have known that the statement was false. Indeed the more natural
inference is that he almost certainly did not. The Supreme Court's decision
in Time, Inc., v. Pape 2 87 is an important precedent in this area. In that case
a reporter for the defendant, Time magazine, wrote that a report of the
United States Civil Rights Commission stated that the plaintiff, a police of-
ficer, searched and arrested a black man in a brutal and illegal manner when
in fact the report was only summarizing the facts set forth in the complaint
that the man had filed with the Commission. 288 The Court held that the
plaintiff could not establish actual malice where the reporter was simply
adopting one rational interpretation of an inherently ambiguous docu-
ment.289 This is an important principle for the reporter covering legal pro-
ceedings who will frequently be placed in the position of having to decipher
and explain ambiguous legal documents under deadline pressure with little
assistance.
In Bandelin v. Pietsch a reporter wrote that a public figure attorney had
been " 'judged in contempt of... court'" when in fact the order on which
the reporter relied only directed the prosecuting attorney to initiate con-
tempt proceedings. 290 Citing Pape the Supreme Court of Idaho concluded
that even though the reporter purported to have some familiarity with legal
concepts, a court could not predicate a finding of reckless disregard on the
misinterpretation of the court order.291 Likewise in Orr v. Argus - Press Co.
287. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
288. Id. at 280-83.
289. Id. at 289-90. But cf Sprague v. Walter, 357 Pa. Super. 570, 516 A.2d 706 (1986)
(deletion of the phrase "re-write, which excised 'hearsay' and realigned " 'allegedly' " from
description of trial testimony, was one of several factors raising inference of reckless disre-
gard), aff'd, 518 Pa. 425, 543 A.2d 1078, appeal dismissed, 109 S.Ct. 548, 102 L.Ed.2d 576
(1988).
290. 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395, 396, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891 (1977). The court later
judged the attorney in contempt; however, an appellate court reversed the conviction. Id.
291. 563 P.2d at 399; see also Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d
1072, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 1984) (insufficient evidence of reckless disregard where editor misread
footnote in government report as stating plaintiff as well as another individual had his sentence
reduced when in fact he had the charge dismissed), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Waskow
v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (insufficient evidence of reckless
disregard shown where reporter wrote that the court had convicted the plaintiff with Dr.
Spock and two others, relying on Associated Press bulletin that stated that the plaintiff had
participated in a demonstration with Spock and the two others, and that a court had convicted
all "three"); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196, 1204 (D.D.C. 1977) (federal
district court did not find reckless disregard for the truth where reporter wrote that evidence in
judicial proceeding concerned campaign contributions when it in fact pertained to expendi-
tures, considering story was written under deadline pressure and "almost all the reporters who
were present at the hearing were very confused about precisely what was going on"); Wanless
v. Rothballer, 115 Ill. 2d 158, 503 N.E.2d 316, 323 (1986) (court could not find sufficient
evidence of reckless disregard for the truth where reporter may have misunderstood details of
and was careless in explaining village attorney's fee arrangements with village and private
clients suggesting a double payment or a conflict of interest), cert.denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987);
10531990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on Pape in concluding that
a court could not base a finding of reckless disregard for the truth on a
reporter's characterization of an indictment charging an attorney with thirty
four violations of the state securities laws as "fraud.
' 292
In most of these cases nothing particularly ambiguous or confusing about
the legal terminology in issue appears to a lawyer, but the terminology might
well appear quite misleading to the lay reporter and reader. Dupler v. Mans-
field Journal 293 is a good example. There, a reporter drew the quite under-
standable but incorrect conclusion that a police officer who had conducted a
search without a warrant had conducted an illegal search. 294 Perhaps the
reporter should have known better, but the fact that he made the mistake
was not sufficient to show that it was highly likely that he was aware of his
error.
In some cases questions arise as to whether the legal terminology or de-
scription really was ambiguous. For instance, Melon v. Capital Cities Press
involved a statement in a police report that the police arrested three individ-
uals on a variety of specified drug charges. The court concluded that the
statement was ambiguous. 295 One could construe the statement as sug-
gesting that the police arrested each individual on each specific charge or
that the police arrested each on only some of the charges or alternatively
that it carried only the latter meaning. 296 In such a case, this determination
was a question of fact for the jury to resolve.
297
Similarly, mere overstatement or exaggeration of a legal charge or its sig-
nificance generally cannot constitute a showing of reckless disregard for the
truth.298 For example, stating that a court convicted the plaintiff of conspir-
Fitzpatrick v Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 17 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1210, 1215 (Pa. Super.
1988) (insufficient evidence of reckless disregard where newspaper referred to individual as a
client of plaintiff attorney although plaintiff only argued at consolidated appearance on behalf
of the individual and co-defendant).
292. 586 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
293. 64 Ohio St. 2d 116, 413 N.E.2d 1187 (1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 962 (1981).
294. 413 N.E.2d at 1193; see also Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, 469 F. Supp. 1053,
1054-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (insufficient evidence of reckless disregard where reporter errone-
ously assumed that if fees for one of the lawyers in an estate proceeding totaled $100,000, fees
for the other six attorneys must total six times that amount); Standke v. B. E. Darby & Sons,
Inc., 291 Minn. 468, 480-82, 193 N.W.2d 139, 141-42, 148 (1971), cert. dismissed, 406 U.S. 902
(1972) (insufficient evidence of reckless disregard where defendant incorrectly assumed after
some research that grand jury was legally required to issue report).
295. 407 So. 2d 85, 86-87 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 409 So. 2d 656 (La. 1982).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Williams v. Pasma, 202 Mont. 66, 656 P.2d 212, 216 (1982) (insufficient evidence of
reckless disregard where reporter wrote that plaintiff was "'charged" rather than " 'in-
dicted' ") cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); DeCarvalho v. daSilva, 414 A.2d 806, 809, 815
(R.I. 1980) (insufficient evidence of reckless disregard where newspaper inaccurately suggested
more than one conviction and exaggerated underlying facts); Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co.,
76 Wash. 2d 707, 459 P.2d 8, 18-19 (1969) (insufficient evidence of reckless disregard where
reporter wrote that allegations in complaint stated that plaintiff engaged in " 'illegal' " rather
than " 'unlawful' " action arguably suggesting that it constituted a criminal, instead of a civil,
violation), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970); cf. Bryant v. Associated Press, 595 F. Supp. 814,
816 (D.V.I. 1984) (insufficient evidence of reckless disregard where reporter wrote that police
arrested plaintiff and charged him with arson when in fact police arrested plaintiff and charged
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acy to commit burglary when in fact the police only charged him with the
offense does not by itself amount to a showing of reckless disregard for the
truth.299 Cases such as these recognize that a reporter is not expected to
comprehend legal nuances that might be obvious to a lawyer; misuse of legal
terminology thus does not by itself indicate that the reporter must have
known that a statement was probably untrue.
A case can arise, of course, where under the circumstances a reporter mis-
uses a legal term of art so egregiously or states the nature or significance of a
legal proceeding so incorrectly that the factfinder may infer that he must
have been aware that what he was writing quite likely was false. In
DiLorenzo v. New York News a reporter wrote that a court convicted the
plaintiff, a judge, of perjury but that the court dropped the charges when in
fact the court had acquitted the judge of some charges and the court
dropped the remainder without any conviction.3°° The reporter testified
that he knew that the police had charged the plaintiff and that he got out
from under the indictment and admitted that he "'did not have a clear un-
derstanding of the various legal steps leading to dismissal of the
charges.' ",301 The New York appellate court concluded that reporting that
a court had convicted the judge of criminal charges when the reporter did
not really know that that was the case could give rise to an inference of
reckless disregard.30 2 This seems correct because the reporter was aware
that he really did not know whether the serious charges that he was report-
ing were true or not.
When the plaintiff is not a public figure, however, and the standard of
fault is negligence or the somewhat higher but still objectively measured
standard of gross irresponsibility, 30 3 the chance increases that a reporter's
failure to understand and properly explain a legal proceeding or to accu-
rately use a legal term of art will lead to liability. Unlike the reckless disre-
gard standard, which focuses on the reporter's subjective knowledge of the
probable truth or falsity of the defamatory allegation, 304 a negligence analy-
him with inciting a riot); Guthrie v. Annabel, 50 Ill. App. 3d 969, 365 N.E.2d 1367, 1371-72
1977) (insufficient proof of reckless disregard where publisher wrote that seizure of his prop-
erty by plaintiff constituted "theft" though attorney had advised him that no criminal proceed-
ings could be brought against the plaintiff while civil proceedings were pending).
299. Novel v. Garrison, 338 F. Supp. 977, 983 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
300. 78 A.D.2d 669, 432 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (1981).
301. 432 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
302. Id. at 486; see also McHale v. Lake Charles American Press, 309 So. 2d 556, 568 (La.
Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, (reckless disregard found where reporter, who knew bonds ap-
proved by plaintiff had been successfully sold in the past, wrote that no one would buy securi-
ties on plaintiff's opinion); cf. Grebner v. Runyon, 132 Mich. App. 327, 347 N.W.2d 741
(1984) (sufficient evidence of reckless disregard to preclude summary judgment where among
other things plaintiff alleged that defendant must have known that a district court could not
issue an indictment).
303. See Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 341 N.E.2d
569, 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (1975) (New York Court of Appeals decided to apply a gross
irresponsibility standard to matters "arguably within the sphere of legitimate public concern").
Most reports of judicial proceedings would probably fall within this sphere. See supra note
155.
304. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
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sis turns on whether a reasonable reporter would or should have known that
the statement was false regardless of whether the defendant did or did not
know. It is likely that many, if not most, jurisdictions will apply a profes-
sional standard and thus look to common journalistic custom and practice to
determine whether the reporter acted reasonably. 30 5 Presumably, a newspa-
per is under a duty to see that a reporter assigned to cover legal matters has
received at least a modest introduction to legal and judicial systems.30 6 Sim-
ilarly, a reporter must make a reasonable attempt to ascertain and compre-
hend the information, verify it, and present it accurately in order to avoid
negligently publishing defamatory falsehood.
30 7
Time, Inc. v. Firestone30 8 is a prominent case involving publication of a
defamatory falsehood resulting from a reporter's arguably negligent misun-
derstanding of a court order. There, the Florida trial court issued a judg-
ment discussing evidence of adultery and mental cruelty by both parties but
apparently granted the divorce only on the latter ground in the absence of a
specific fact finding on either ground. 30 9 Relying on information received
from a wire service report, a newspaper account, a "stringer" in Florida, and
Time's Miami Bureau chief, Time's staff in New York wrote a paragraph
stating that Russell Firestone divorced Mary Alice Firestone on grounds of
extreme cruelty and adultery. Mary Alice Firestone sued Time for defama-
tion and received a substantial judgment which the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida affirmed.
3 10
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and in an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist held that the plaintiff was not a public figure
nor was her divorce litigation a public controversy under Gertz.31I The
Court then turned to the question of fault and noted that the Supreme Court
of Florida had concluded that "[a] careful examination of the final decree
prior to publication would have clearly demonstrated that the divorce had
been granted on the grounds of extreme cruelty ..... [and thus] [t]his is a
flagrant example of 'journalistic negligence.' ",312 Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested that if in fact the Florida court were making a finding of fault (pre-
sumably negligence), it apparently would have sufficed under Gertz.
313
Because it was unclear that the Florida court actually intended to make a
specific finding of fault, however, the United States Supreme Court vacated
305. See Bloom, supra note 11, at 341-45.
306. Many of the leading journalism texts provide a fairly detailed description of the legal
system along with extensive guidance on how to properly cover the courts and legal affairs.
See, e. g., F. FEDLER, REPORTING FOR THE PRINT MEDIA 269-303 (1977); M. MENCHER,
NEWS REPORTING AND WRITING 529-548 (1981); H. SCHULTE, REPORTING PUBLIC AF-
FAIRS 163-279 (1981).
307. See generally Bloom, supra note 11, at 346-84 (discussing proof of negligence and
gross irresponsibility in media defamation cases).
308. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
309. Id at 458-59.
310. Id. at 449-50.
311. Id. at 448.
312. Id. at 463.
313. Id. at 463-64.
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the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. 31 4
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell questioned whether a court
could have properly made a finding of negligence on the record before the
court. 31 5 He pointed out that the reporters, who discussed the judgment
with the plaintiff's attorney, were operating under fairly tight deadline pres-
sure, and perhaps most significantly, were attempting to decipher a rather
opaque judicial order. On the latter point he noted that the order itself never
expressly stated the grounds on which the court granted the divorce.
Rather, as the Supreme Court of Florida had explained, the court could not
have granted the divorce on grounds of adultery because it ordered the peti-
tioner to pay the respondent alimony which would not have been permissible
under Florida law.3 16 Without conclusively deciding the issue, Justice Pow-
ell indicated that he believed that a reasonably prudent newsman could cer-
tainly read the trial court's decree and fail to understand that adultery was
not the basis of the judgment. 3 17 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall
argued that the principle of Time, Inc. v. Pape, that a court could not base a
finding of reckless disregard on a rational interpretation of an ambiguous
document, was equally applicable under a negligence approach and would
preclude liability. 
3 18
The Firestone dicta on the proof of fault issue suggests that a reporter who
writes about private figures involved in legal proceedings risks negligence
liability if he is not careful to ensure that he fully understands the signifi-
cance of the matters he is discussing. Nontheless, on the facts before the
Court the concurring opinion of Justice Powell and the dissenting opinion of
Justice Marshall seem more persuasive on the issue of fault than the sugges-
tions to the contrary by the majority. The trial court's order was indeed
confusing. It would seem unduly burdensome to require a reporter to pos-
sess the knowledge of a family law specialist, or for that matter to consult
with one, and then base his explanation of the case on a close and not readily
apparent reading of the order. Perhaps the most scrupulous reporters would
do just that, but surely the Florida Supreme Court was wrong in suggesting
that it was clearly unreasonable to fail to take such precautions. Such exacti-
tude seems inconsistent with the degree of leeway that courts ordinarily ac-
cord the press when it is attempting to comprehend and explain complex
legal matters. Hopefully, Justice Powell's approach would have prevailed if
the Court had addressed the issue on the merits rather than in dicta.
The recent case of Gazette v. Harris provides an illustration of a fairly
clear instance of negligent reporting of a legal matter due to the reporter's
lack of familiarity with the terminology he was summarizing. 31 9 There, a
newspaper editor sent a novice reporter to the courthouse to verify a story
about a recent child abuse case. The reporter copied the docket entry with-
314. Id. at 464.
315. Id. at 464-70.
316. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 172, 178 (Fla. 1974), vacated, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
317. 424 U.S. at 470.
318. Id. at 484, 490-91.
319. 229 Va. 1, 325 S.E.2d 713, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1985).
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out a clear understanding of the abbreviated terminology. As a result, he
submitted a summary for publication which seemed to indicate that the par-
ents of the child who had in fact filed the complaint were instead being
charged with the offense. Unlike Firestone, the reporter was aware of his
own ignorance and the docket entry was not particularly misleading. The
Virginia Supreme Court quite properly held that the jury could find that the
reporter and editor had failed to comply with the standard of care reflected
by prevailing journalistic custom with respect to the reporting of serious
crimes.
320
Levine v. CMP Publications321 presented the converse of Gazette v. Harris.
In Levine the reporter clearly understood that the legal proceedings she was
covering were civil in nature, but by describing them in language which sug-
gested they were criminal in character, such as "[plaintiff] was convicted of
stealing," she negligently defamed the plaintiff.322 The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found that the evidence of negligence sufficed to affirm the
verdict 323 and also found sufficient evidence of reckless disregard for the
truth to affirm an award of punitive damages with respect to one of the two
defamatory articles in question.324
One should not take those cases to suggest, however, that a defamatory
publication resulting from a reporter's misunderstanding of legal proceed-
ings or misuse of legal terminology necessarily leads to a finding of negli-
gence. In LaMon v. Butler,325 for instance, a reporter published a series of
articles in which she noted that a municipal court had convicted the plaintiff
of assault. This was true, but the plaintiff had appealed the conviction to the
superior court. The superior court dismissed the appeal with prejudice,
which had the effect of voiding the municipal court conviction. 326 The re-
porter was aware of the dismissal; in fact, she had had it read over the phone
to her. It did not indicate on its face, however, that it had any impact on the
municipal court conviction. The reporter testified that she discussed the dis-
missal order with the city attorney and he informed her that it had no effect
320. Id. No attempt to verify the truth of the report was made. The article published only
the defendant's names in the three preceding items. The reporter omitted the term
"CMPLNT" from the article. Finally, the reporter admitted that it " 'looked like an error'."
Id. The court in the companion case of Charlottesville Newspapers, Inc. v. Matthews, 229 Va.
1, 325 S.E.2d 713 (1985), affirmed a finding of negligence where a reporter referred to a mar-
ried pregnant rape victim as "Miss" on several occasions after having read a trial transcript in
which she was properly referred to as "Mrs." 325 S.E.2d at 732, 734-35.
321. 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1984).
322. Id. at 673-74.
323. Id. The judge in the civil proceeding in issue had specifically stated that he had no
authority to adjudicate criminal liability. In addition, the plaintiff had informed the defendant
reporter, after she had published it in another article, that it incorrectly made him look like a
criminal. Finally, plaintiff's expert witness testified that the phrase in question suggested that
the court had criminally convicted the plaintiff, and defendant's expert admitted that the lan-
guage was potentially libelous. With respect to the first, but not the second article, Judge Tate
dissented, arguing that the evidence of negligence as well as of falsity was insufficient. Id. at
678.
324. Id. at 674-75.
325. 110 Wash. 2d 216, 751 P.2d 842 (1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 61, 107 L.Ed. 2d 29
(1989).
326. 110 Wash. 2d at 222-23, 751 P.2d at 845.
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on the municipal court conviction. On these facts, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that a court could not find the plaintiff to have acted negli-
gently. 327 At most it should have caused her to conduct a further inquiry,
which she did. This result clearly seems correct and very much in line with
the cases that tend to give reporters a fair margin of error when interpreting




A significant number of reported defamation cases involve press reports of
legal matters or proceedings. This is not surprising considering that in this
area the press is often required to decipher and explain complex and techni-
cal information involving potentially defamatory charges under tight dead-
line pressure. On the threshold issue of the plaintiff's status, and hence the
appropriate standard of fault, the Supreme Court has largely developed the
public figure doctrine in cases involving press coverage of legal affairs. Both
the Supreme Court and the lower courts have tended to construe the con-
cepts of the public figure and the public controversy somewhat narrowly in
favor of the plaintiffs. Concern that it would be unfair to require persons
who the press has defamed as a result of legal proceedings to surmount the
difficult actual malice standard in order to recover compensation for injury
to reputation seems to prompt this approach. This seems appropriate as a
matter of fairness and as a matter of policy to avoid deterring individuals
from asserting or defending legal claims.
Similarly, the Court has considered but declined to adopt a constitutional
judicial proceedings privilege which would have extended the strict actual
malice standard to all mass media reports of judicial proceedings. Here the
Court also appears motivated by a desire to avoid unfairly burdening poten-
tial defamation plaintiffs who have not voluntarily assumed celebrity status
and who may be unable to fend for themselves in the media marketplace.
The Court's recognition of the formidable burden that it has imposed on
public figure defamation plaintiffs through the actual malice and clear and
convincing evidence standards largely drives the Court's reluctance. It is
quite likely that a negligence standard, carefully applied, focusing on the
professional standards of the journalism profession will afford the private
327. Id.
328. See also Grobe v. Three Village Heralds, 69 A.D.2d 175, 420 N.Y.S.2d 3, aff'd, 49
N.Y.2d 932, 406 N.E.2d 491, 428 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1980). In that case the evidence of the re-
porter's statement that plaintiff had pleaded guilty when in fact the court had granted
an"adjournment in contemplation of dismissal" after the police officer had told the reporter of
the guilty plea was insufficient to find gross irresponsibility. The police officer was the father of
the boy that the plaintiff was charged with assaulting. He testified that he believed that an
ACOD was interchangeable with a guilty plea. A dissent argued that the fact that the reporter
was inexperienced as a police reporter and that a court clerk had told him that the plaintiff
" 'had pleaded guilty and received [an] ACOD' " should be sufficient to raise an issue of gross
irresponsibility given that the reporter made no further attempt to learn the significance of
ACOD. 420 N.Y.S.2d at 5, 6. Apparently under New York law, an adjournment in contem-
plation of dismissal is not the same as plea of guilty. 420 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
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figure plaintiff a fair opportunity to recover and at the same time provide the
press with sufficient guidance and adequate protection for professionally re-
sponsible reporting. If a need for greater accommodation of the interests in
reputation and public information exists, courts could more readily achieve
it by applying the public figure doctrine and the clear and convincing evi-
dence rule in the legal affairs context more liberally instead of adopting a
judicial proceedings privilege.
If the courts have tilted in the direction of the plaintiffs on the public
figure/standard of fault issue, they seem to tilt back in the direction of the
defendants on many of the other issues that arise in legal affairs defamation
cases. On questions pertaining to the accurate use of legal terminology and
the description of legal proceedings, the courts tend to favor defendants, al-
lowing the press a fair margin of error. This pattern holds true under several
common law and constitutional doctrines including defamatory meaning,
truth, fair report privilege, fact or opinion and proof of fault. The deck is
not unfairly stacked against the plaintiff since the cases reveal that a plaintiff
with a solid case can still prevail on all of these issues.
When one considers the public figure and legal terminology and descrip-
tion cases together, they evince an effort by the courts to accomodate the
interest in the protection of reputation of persons involved in legal proceed-
ings with the important interest in disseminating information about these
proceedings to the public. The combination of those two approaches may go
a long way toward reducing, although certainly not eliminating, the inevita-
ble tension.
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